[EM] Mike's suggestions for Public Proposals

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Wed Sep 21 14:02:16 PDT 2005


--- "Simmons, Forest " <simmonfo at up.edu> a écrit :
> Mike suggest that the best public proposals are ...
> "Best: MDDA, or maybe MDDB, which combine FBC with SFC, thereby accomodating
> the needs of different kinds of voters.  It now seems to me that MDDA is
> better than MDDB. I'd said that SR would be a good proposal under certain
> Forest asks:
> How about Majority Choice Approval ?  Like RV it is strategically equivalent to Approval,  but
> allows for more expressiveness than Approval.  It has the nice explicit reference to Majority:
> If any candidate is marked "favored" on a majority (more than fifty percent) of the ballots,
> then the one with the greatest majority wins.  When there is no majority favorite, the most
> approved candidate wins.
> Also, do I remember correctly that MDDA starts by eliminating all candidates defeated by a
> majority of voters, and if there are any left, electing the most approved of these, otherwise
> falling back to most approved of all the candidates?

That's right.

I think MCA's main advantage over MDDA is the simplicity of the count.

MDDA's advantages over MCA are 1) strategy isn't the same as approval, 2) MDDA
also satisfies SFC, which means some extra insurance for majority-strength wins.

MCA's majority reference isn't an advantage over MDDA. And MDDA's relative
insensitivity to the rankings (which I would normally complain about) isn't
worse than MCA's.

The disadvantages of ICA relative to MDDA are 1) it's harder to explain, and 
2) ICA doesn't satisfy SFC.

ER-Bucklin(whole) is more interesting than I first thought. I don't know of
another method which satisfies both FBC and the majority criterion for solid

Kevin Venzke


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