[EM] RE: Election-methods Digest, Vol 15, Issue 37

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 10:49 PM 9/20/2005, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>Even if I am my favorite candidate (and wish to be elected), there 
>is no guarantee
>that sending myself to the completion convention is my best move. My 
>presence in
>this convention could alter the winner undesirably from my perspective.

Of course, and it might be undesirable for other reasons as well. 
But, basic law of the universe: either you represent yourself or 
someone else represents you or you are not represented.

It is unclear why Mr. Venzke's presence would alter the result 
unfavorably, unless he opens his mouth and nastiness comes out in 
such a way as to alter people's perception of the otherwise-winner.

We are talking about Asset Voting. Mr. Venzke's vote would be public 
at the convention, yes, but unless he was a major player, the vast 
majority of people would not even know that he exists.

So if you can't go, or don't want to go, then vote for someone you 
trust. If you are wise, you will not pick someone with exactly the 
same set of preferences as yourself; rather, you will pick based on 
general agreement *and character*. If you pick someone accessible, 
you can even inform that person of your personal preferences; but, in 
the end, at the convention, you don't want a rubber-stamp, you would 
want, I would sugggest, someone whose wisdom and intelligence you 
trust as being equal or better than your own.

And if there is no such person, I would argue that you should really 
attend the convention, the world needs you.

I find people making the weirdest objections to proxy systems....

>Also, there's a second election at this convention! Supposing the 
>method used at
>this convention satisfies weak FBC, what have we gained (in terms of 
>FBC compliance)
>by voting for delegates first?

The convention is a deliberative body where there could be dozens of 
runoffs or more, within hours. Deliberative process is not limited or 
afflicted specially by negative election criteria, because it does 
not have to satisfy one of the most commonly applied: that it chooses 
a winner with a single poll. It is this requirement that leads to 
most of the criterion failures.

In Election by Delegable Proxy, as I recall, I indicated that the 
Convention would have authority over its own election method. In the 
end, it would have the right to ratify a winner by a majority vote. 
(Or fail to ratify the winner by the process it chose.) (In 
procedural votes, each elector would have as many votes as were 
receiving in the election.)

What this means is that the electors present would decide which was 
more important: seeking and finding at least a majority in agreement, 
or finishing the process without having done that. Because this is a 
decision that would properly depend on very complex factors, such as 
the challenges immediately faced by the sociey, setting rules to deal 
with the contingency of majority failure at the convention is unwise, 
in my opinion.

Basic principle of democracy: the majority retains the right of decision.