[EM] Re: Condorcet's strategy problem, ICA

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Sat Sep 17 18:15:05 PDT 2005


--- Rob Lanphier <robla at robla.net> a écrit :
> My understanding is that FBC is mutually exclusive of the Condorcet
> winner criteria.  As I've stated above, when Condorcet winner is
> violated, there's a good chance that one person, one vote has been
> violated.

> I will be willing to bet that there's some element of this problem in
> any FBC complying method.

What about Minmax(pairwise opposition), in which the winner is the candidate
for whom the greatest number of votes against him in any contest is the
smallest such score among all candidates?

The change necessary to permit my ICA method to satisfy FBC sacrifices 
Condorcet hardly at all.

This is Condorcet:
"If there is one candidate who beats all the others, he must win."

ICA satisfies this:
"If there is one candidate who doesn't lose to any others after certain losses
are disregarded (due to being reversible by voters using equal-top ranking),
he must win."

ICA scales Condorcet back only as far as is necessary to satisfy FBC.

Kevin Venzke


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