[EM] Re: Condorcet's strategy problem

eric at ericgorr.net eric at ericgorr.net
Wed Sep 14 16:11:56 PDT 2005

Quoting MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>:
> Someone posted a wv failure-example to EM a while back. I'll try to 
> find another example, but I admit that it's easier said than done. 
> The important thing is that, as long as there's any chance that 
> voting Nader instead of Dean in 1st place will let Cheney win, you 
> can be sure that the progressives will mostly vote Dean in 1st place, 
> though they prefer Nader.

Personally, I would consider such an example only valid if the Cheney 
voters did
not have a counter strategy and if the Nader voters could confidently 
make such
adjustments without needing accurate enough information about how the
electorate was going to vote beyond what can be determined by a standard poll
(say +/- 3%).

I have yet to see any example, demonstrating the strategic problems 
with a good
WV Condorcet Method which would pass these two tests.

Of course, among the things that would happen should an accurate polling be
sufficient to successfully strategically vote would be the creation of voters
who would no longer supply accurate information to the poll takers.

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