[EM] Re: Empirical data on cycles

[Kevin Venzke]

Rob,

--- Rob LeGrand <honky1998 at yahoo.com> a écrit :
> and the fact that winning-votes encourages equal ranks
> near the top of the ballot and full ranking near the bottom even
> when insincere (and even in the zero-info case!) that I prefer
> margins to winning-votes.

I think it's truer that WV encourages full ranking near the bottom *mainly*
in the zero-info case. If you rank lower than your needed compromises in
WV, you enable others to use burying strategy against you.

The way I see it is that margins and IRV are more strategy-free in the
zero-info case, while WV and approval are more strategy-free when you do
have information.

For example, in simulations I ran, Schulze(margins) offered a certain faction
favorite betrayal incentive 20 times more often than Schulze(wv) did. This is
useless when the elections are zero-info, but it could be undesirable if
margins were used in an election where voters possess some information.

Approval, of course, nevers offer favorite betrayal incentive.

Kevin Venzke



	

	
		
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