[EM] Citation for immunity to strategic voting?

[Stephane Rouillon]

Actually as many people will tell you,
this claim is wrong.

I see that Rob already gave you a counter example.

Maybe you would like to know that using winning vote as
criteria to make pairwise comparison instead of margins
can make your claim true for strong Condorcet winners
(ones which have a more than 50% majority against every
other candidate).  Using margin as a criteria your claim is only valid
for stronger Condorcet winners (having a 2/3 majority against
every other candidate).

Finally, no method is know to garantee the election of a weak
Condorcet winner against unsincere preferences. This
is understandable because absentees can always alter the balance
against the Condorcet winner and hope to unsincerely create
a cycle containing one of their better choice.

Hope it helps,
Steph.

Andrew Myers a écrit :

> Hi all,
>
> I'm writing a short paper on secure implementations of Condorcet voting.
> I would like to claim that Condorcet methods are immune to strategic
> voting when there is a Condorcet winner (that is, voters cannot improve
> the election result from their perspective by voting insincerely). Is there
> an appropriate paper to cite that makes this argument clearly? Thanks much,
>
> -- Andrew
> ----
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