nkklrp at hotmail.com
Wed Sep 21 21:38:10 PDT 2005
How about Majority Choice Approval ? Like RV it is strategically equivalent
to Approval, but allows for more expressiveness than Approval.
But can a voter give that favoriteness vote to two or more candidates?
Because, if not, then MCA would fail FBC. And if so, the meaning of _the
favorite_ of a majorilty, as opposed to an Approval count, would be diluted,
especially for the public that it's being proposed to. Allowing more than
one "favorite" vote, which could be given to a nonfavorite compromise too,
could complicate the method for the publc that it is proposed to.
Maybe, even then, MCA is a little simpler than MDDA, but not much simpler:
"A candidate is disqualified if another candidate is ranked over him/her by
a majority. The undisqualified candidate ranked by the most people wins."
[end of MDDA definition]
(As you said, if everyone is majority-defeated, then no one is
I don't know if that's any more complicated or wordy than MCA. And it meets
SFC & SDSC.
Additionally, it doesn't attract the fallacious 1-person-1-vote objection
that always besets Approval.
It [MCA] has the nice explicit reference to Majority: If any candidate is
marked "favored" on a majority (more than fifty percent) of the ballots,
then the one with the greatest majority wins.
MDDA matches MCA's majority favorite advantage:
In MDDA, if a majority rank X alone in 1st place, that gives X a majority
defeat against every one of the other candidates, resulting in the
disqualification of everyone but X. If you rank X in 1st place, maybe with
other candidates, then you're helping X have a majority defeat against
everyone except for the others you rank in 1st place.
And indifference is the only thing that could make MDDA fail Condorcet's
Criterion. Without at least a little indifference, a CW has majorities
against everyone. One could argue that the more indifferently-supported a CW
is, the less important it is. The only way for that CC failure to need only
very little indifference, would be if it's a very close pairwise race.
Also, do I remember correctly that MDDA starts by eliminating all candidates
defeated by a majority of voters, and if there are any left, electing the
most approved of these, otherwise falling back to most approved of all the
Yes, that's MDDA. In its standard definition, in MDDA a ballot gives an
Approval vote to (only) all the candidates that it ranks.
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