MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp at hotmail.com
Tue Sep 20 16:40:47 PDT 2005


Thanks for yoiur answer to my question about DMC's definition, and for your 
postings about its properties.

Sure, DMC has some desirable properties, and, having a pairwise count and a 
points count, lets those counts serve as "checks & balances" for eachother.

I don't claim that my criteria are the only important ones, or criticize 
other criteria or properties, but there are several criteria that, for me, 
are the important ones.

For public political elections:

FBC. That's the important one for public political elections. But SFC would 
be good too, and also the other majority defensive strategy criteria--GSFC, 

For organizations and committees:

The majority defensive strategy criteria--SFC, GSFC, WDSC, & SDSC. If an 
organization has a really undesirable candidate, as is possible even in a 
small organization, then FBC would be convenient to have. But it would come 
at the cost of GSFC, and, less importantlyi, Ccndorcet's Criterion & Smith's 
Criterion. As I was saying yesterday, FBC is only really necessary when 
there's at least one reallly undesirable candidate, AND some voters are 
seriously mistaken (in the opinioni of other voters) aboiut what is 
acceptable. Though that condition definitely obtains in our public political 
elections, it probably won't happen in organizations, and so, since FBC is 
probably incompatible with GSFC, I'd probabaly choose GSFC.

Approval & RV have the social optimization properties that some of have 
already discussed.

Because of thoses criterion preferences, I like the following methods.

Organizations & committees:

BeatpathWinner or CSSD. Or, if more simplicity is desired) PC, MDDA or MDDB. 
Choosing between PC vs MDDA or MDDB would be a matter of choosing between 
FBC vs Condorcet's Criterion and Smith's Criterion. Since PC might not meet 
GSFC, the choice beween it and MDDA or MDDB isn't so obvious. I'm not sure 
which I'd choose. Approval or RV would be good too, but, for this 
application I prefer the rank method listed.

Public political elections:

Best: MDDA, or maybe MDDB, which combine FBC with SFC, thereby accomodating 
the needs of different kinds of voters.  It now seems to me that MDDA is 
better than MDDB. I'd said that SR would be a good proposal under certain 
conditions, when people insist on a really simple rank method that only has 
one part. But the power-truncation that SR needs probably spoils its 
one-part simplicity. Of course the power truncation could be added 
aftwerwards though, in a subsequent initiative. So maybe SR is still in the 
running.  Approval or RV would be good too, meeting FBC and having 
advantages of their own. Most winnable of the good public methods: RV.

Mike Ossipoff

Mike Ossipoff

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