[EM] RE: Election-methods Digest, Vol 15, Issue 37
simmonfo at up.edu
Mon Sep 19 14:05:16 PDT 2005
> That said, an even simpler method comes closer to satisfying the Strong FBC than any of these
> other more complicated methods: Asset Voting:
> Voters vote for their favorite, who represents them by proxy in an election completion
> convention. Write-ins are allowed. In the completion convention the proxies (i.e. the
> candidates including write-ins) get as many votes (their "assets") as they were granted by the
> voters. In other words, whatever ballots they cast in the election completion method (some
> reliable method like Approval, DMC, or Shulze) are given weights equal to their "assets."
Kevin responded with:
I don't share the view that this is closer to satisfying strong FBC. You have
no confidence that your candidate will be able to (or willing to) help cement
the best result you could have gotten. There is little reason to believe that
your favorite candidate can pick a compromise better than you can.
It's not even guaranteed that at least one candidate shares your preference order.
Are you saying that under Asset voting it would frequently happen that you would vote for someone other than your favorite?
Remember that write-ins are allowed, so that you can always vote for your self and cast your own approval and ordinal rankings in the election completion convention. In that case, wouldn't you say that you are your favorite candidate?
Or are you just saying that although this method might come very close to satisfying the Strong FBC, some other method like ICA, which completely satisfies the weak FBC would probably give better results, since the voters have more control without having to attend the election completion convention?
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