[EM] Definition of "sincere approval voting" (was FBC comparison: WV, margins, MMPO, DMC)
chrisbenham at bigpond.com
Sun Sep 18 08:27:21 PDT 2005
>--- Jobst Heitzig <heitzig-j at web.de> a écrit :
>>> We could discuss whether insincere equal ranking for top is more dishonest or whether approving
>>> one more candidate is more dishonest...
>In my opinion, insincere equal ranking is more insincere than approving
>an additional candidate.
I strongly agree with this.
>"Sincere approval voting" isn't even clearly
I've seen one definition that says that as long as the voter sincerely
prefers all the candidates s/he approves to all the ones s/he doesn't,
then the "approval vote" is sincere. To me this is mainly a bit of
sophistry for the purpose of promoting Approval.
This is my proposed clear definition:
"An 'approval vote' is one that makes some approval distinction among
the candidates. It is sincere if
(1)the voter sincerely prefers all the approved candidates (or single
candidate) to all the not approved candidates (or single candidate), and
(2) it is how the voter would vote without any knowledge or guess as to
how other voters might vote."
By this definition, DMC (like IRV and unlike WV) meets "No
Zero-Information Strategy". No method can make it impossible for
strategists to sometimes have an advantage, but it irks me that WV has
non-obvious fairly sophisticated strategy for "zero-information" voters
(random-fill and if you have a big ratings gap, equal-rank above it).
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