<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html>
<head>
<meta content="text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1" http-equiv="Content-Type">
<title></title>
</head>
<body bgcolor="#ffffff" text="#000000">
Kevin,<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">--- Jobst Heitzig <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
href="mailto:heitzig-j@web.de"><heitzig-j@web.de></a> a écrit :
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap=""><span class="moz-txt-citetags">> </span>We could discuss whether insincere equal ranking for top is more dishonest or whether approving
<span class="moz-txt-citetags">> </span>one more candidate is more dishonest...
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
In my opinion, insincere equal ranking is more insincere than approving
an additional candidate.
</pre>
</blockquote>
I strongly agree with this.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">"Sincere approval voting" isn't even clearly
defined.</pre>
</blockquote>
I've seen one definition that says that as long as the voter sincerely
prefers all the candidates s/he approves to all the ones s/he doesn't,<br>
then the "approval vote" is sincere. To me this is mainly a bit of
sophistry for the purpose of promoting Approval.<br>
<br>
This is my proposed clear definition:<br>
"An 'approval vote' is one that makes some approval distinction among
the candidates. It is sincere if <br>
(1)the voter sincerely prefers all the approved candidates (or single
candidate) to all the not approved candidates (or single candidate), and<br>
(2) it is how the voter would vote without any knowledge or guess as to
how other voters might vote."<br>
<br>
By this definition, DMC (like IRV and unlike WV) meets "No
Zero-Information Strategy". No method can make it impossible for
well-informed<br>
strategists to sometimes have an advantage, but it irks me that WV has
non-obvious fairly sophisticated strategy for "zero-information" voters<br>
(random-fill and if you have a big ratings gap, equal-rank above it).<br>
<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
</body>
</html>