[EM] Dave: More levels of expressable preference

[Paul Kislanko]

Mike Ossippoff wrote: (see below for full text)

 I reply:

I agree.  Most any method is acceptable then, except for Borda, which in its

standard form, forces you to rank all the candidates.
----

This is not an accurate description of what Count de Borda wrote. In its
"standard form" Borda says "a candidate gets a point for every candidate
ranked lower than the candidate." Unranked candidates are clearly ranked
lower, so in a "pure" Borda" there is no requirement to rank all candidates.

Mike may be mixing some IMPLEMENTATIONS of Borda-style methods, but the
Borda METHOD does NOT "force you to rank all the candidates." 

---
Mike continues:

Ranking all the candidates in IRV may be a waste of time, but of course it 
doesn't do any harm for the law to require completel rankings, other than 
more time in the voting booth.
---

I cannot accept this as either a voter or an em analyst. It does GREAT harm
to require to people to express preferences about candidates about which
they know nothing. Those of us who spend a great deal of time and effort
deciding how to order the candidates with which have some familarity will do
no better than providing a random order for those in the complement of that
set.

A method that depends upon "pairwise wins" or "pairwise defeats" could cause
those of us who ranked randomly for the ones we DON'T want to cause one of
those to win over someone we voted for because we didn't understand that we
had to spend as much time working out the intracacies of the voting method. 

Philosophically, basing an election result on the votes of people who were
ignorant of the ramifications of their rankings cannot be said under any
circumstances to "do no harm." Much the reverse - this is one of the worst
things that could happen to us.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: election-methods-bounces at electorama.com 
> [mailto:election-methods-bounces at electorama.com] On Behalf Of 
> MIKE OSSIPOFF
> Sent: Friday, October 21, 2005 3:11 PM
> To: election-methods at electorama.com
> Subject: [EM] Dave: More levels of expressable preference
> 
> You'd said:
> 
> >Can happen that I desire electing Tom and hate Harry. 
> Further, I am not 
> >sure Tom can win so, in case he loses (and only if he 
> loses), I want to do 
> >what I can to make sure Dick gets in as my second choice.
> 
> You add:
> 
> Let me expand on this.  There is a race for mayor in a city 
> near here, the
> "aroma" is unavoidable and, therefore, if I got to vote, my 
> primary goal
> would be that Harry lose (and I do not trust the polls, for I 
> suspect they
> work for Harry):
> 
>       Assume Tom and Dick are equal in my eyes.  Therefore I would be
> happy with Approval and any flavor of Condorcet that 
> permitted =.  IRV is
> not too bad
> 
> I reply:
> 
> As proposed and used, IRV is no good. Unless you know which 
> of {Tom, Dick} 
> is the more winnable one you need to beat Harry, then you 
> have to risk his 
> getting eliminated immediately before your traveling vote 
> gets to him. Of 
> course if {Tom, Dick} is a mutual majority, then IRV would 
> work ok in that 
> particular instance. But, in general, mutual majorities are a 
> fortuitous 
> special case.
> 
> You continue:
> 
>       Or one of my two favorites earns a black eye - not 
> enough to become
> a reject like Harry, but enough that I must do all I van to help ny
> remaining favorite.  Now IRV (except for spoilers) and 
> Condorcet are fine, 
> Approval imposes an intolerable decision.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> No it doesn't. Is Dick acceptable or unacceptable? Vot for 
> him if he's 
> acceptable. Don't vote for him if he's unacceptable. Yes, if Dick is 
> genuinely on the line between acceptability and 
> unacceptability, then you 
> have to flip a coin in Approval (or give Dick 1/2 maximum 
> points in RV).
> 
> In any case, you know what to do.
> 
> If you know what you're doing, Approval is still ok, though 
> not as deluxe as 
> one might like.
> 
> The serious problem happens when people don't know what 
> they're doing, when 
> they're seriously mistaken about whether Dick is acceptable. 
> Then they can't 
> be trusted to be able to use Approval in their own best 
> interest, and MDDA 
> would be a much better thing to have. You'll get no 
> disagreement from me on 
> that.
> 
> You continued:
> 
>       Or my falling favorite joins Harry for being 
> unacceptable.  Now any
> method that tolerates bullet voting becomes acceptable, including
> Plurality and Approval.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> I agree.  Most any method is acceptable then, except for 
> Borda, which in its 
> standard form, forces you to rank all the candidates.
> 
> Ranking all the candidates in IRV may be a waste of time, but 
> of course it 
> doesn't do any harm for the law to require completel 
> rankings, other than 
> more time in the voting booth.
> 
> You continue:
> 
> Thus Approval beats Plurality, but is not an acceptable destination.
> 
> Approval beats anything that doesn't meet FBC, for the 
> purpose of our public 
> political elections.
> 
> In an early posting I said:
> 
> "I liken Approval to a solid, reliable handtool. But the 
> trouble with a 
> handtool, compared to an automatic CW-finding machine like 
> MDDA, is that you 
> have to know how to use the handtool, because it's manual. 
> You have to do it 
> yourself.
> 
> " [for our existing electorate] The question of using MDDA vs 
> using Approval 
> (or RV) is like the question of driving your child to school 
> vs giving the 
> car-keys to your child and saying 'Drive yourself to school. 
> We'll find out 
> how you do'."
> 
> >You quoted me:
> 
> >But if Dick is unacceptable, then no, I won't give him an 
> Approval vote, 
> >even if he is better than Harry.
> 
> You reply:
> 
> You seem to consider existence of yellow to be an impossibility after 
> labeling red "unacceptable" and green "acceptable".
> 
> I reply:
> 
> No, it depends on the candidate lineup. If there are any completely 
> unacceptable candidates who might win, then it's what I call an 
> acceptable/unacceptable situation. There are effectively only 
> two preference 
> levels. There is only one merit boundary that matters.
> 
> And yes, I believe that we have an a/ua situation in our 
> public political 
> elections. In fact the giveway progressives believe that too, 
> though they 
> disagree with me about who is acceptable. They think the 
> Democrats are 
> acceptable. Hence the serious problem with Approval (Unless 
> the giveaway 
> progressives will be able to stop voting for Democrats when, 
> in Approval, 
> Nader outpolls the Republican.
> 
> Another way to describe an a/ua situation is: The candidates 
> can be divided 
> into two sets such that the merit differences within the 2 sets are 
> negligible compared to the merit-difference betweent the 2 sets.
> 
> In Approval, vote for the acceptables. Approval is the 
> perfect method in an 
> a/ua situation, if voters know what they're doing.
> 
> In Plurality, vote for whichever acceptable candidate is most 
> likely, with 
> your help, to be able to deny victory to the unacceptables.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> MANY of us can see more than two colors, and want ballots to 
> comply since it 
> is possible.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> What country do you live in? It's entirely possible that, 
> there, it isn't an 
> a/ua situation.
> 
> Anyway, even if it is, of course I agree that, because voters 
> don't seem 
> very quiified to vote in their own interest,  we'd be much 
> better off with 
> MDDA, MDDB, or MDD,ER-Bucklin(whole) than with Approval. As I 
> said, you'll 
> get no disagreement from me on that.
> 
> I'd said:
> 
> >I can't expect Plurality advocates to like the better voting systems.
> >
> >But if you're saying that they'd have an especially 
> difficult time with 
> >Approval, then I disagree. Approval is just Plurality done 
> right. Plurality 
> >without the completely unjustified rule that a voter may 
> only give a point 
> >to one candidate, only show support for one candidate.
> 
> You reply:
> 
> Seems like you are not responding to what I said - that many 
> of those used 
> to Plurality would see what you claim as acceptable and not 
> see a need to 
> move farther.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> You're saying that if we enacted Approval or RV, people would 
> be satisfied 
> with it and wouldn't want to get a better method. For one 
> thing, if Approval 
> did as it could, and went right to the voter-median position, 
> and stayed 
> there, what would there be for anyone to object to? But if 
> the giveaway 
> progressives keep on giving an Approval vote to the Democrat, 
> after the vote 
> totals have indicated that they no longer need to, then even 
> they will know 
> that something is wrong, and that they'd be better off with a 
> good rank 
> method. How right they'd be!
> 
> So if someone then began advocating MDDA, people would 
> understand the need 
> for it, if Approval obviously was not working (because people weren't 
> qualified to use it).
> 
> I'd said:
> 
> >I observed someone, voting in a Condorcet poll, rank Dick 
> over Tom, even 
> >though that person preferred Tom to Dick. That peron did 
> that because they 
> >felt that Dick had a better chance of beating Harry.
> >
> >Did I tell that person that they had no need to do that in 
> Condorclet? No, 
> >because that would have been an untrue statement. Condorcet doesn't 
> >guarantee that you won't gain by voting someone over your favorite. 
> >Approval does make that guarantee, known as FBC.
> 
> BUT - Approval does not let me vote Tom preferred to Dick, and BOTH 
> preferred to Harry.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> No, but at least it doesn't make anyone feel a need to vote 
> Dick _over_ Tom. 
> Thereby, Approval avoids the worst kind of strategy need.
> 
> You continue:
> 
> Tell me again how voters can improve their odds by voting 
> against their 
> desires - at least other than responding to or cooperating 
> with strategy 
> plots.
> 
> You want an example? Ok, here's the scenario. I'll show that 
> Condorcet's 
> Criterion is incompatible with FBC.
> 
> You can also regard this as a descrption of how Condorcet's 
> method, in any 
> form, can reward someone for voting someone over their favorite:
> 
> Consider two voters whose preference ordering is: B>A>C.
> 
> We're considering how those two people should vote when 
> everyone else is 
> voting in some particular fixed configuration. Say the 
> configuration of 
> other people's votes (sincere or otherwise) is such that if 
> those two voters 
> vote sincerely, we'll get a circular tie in which C wins. 
> Obviously, given 
> any rule for solving circular ties, I could write an example 
> in which C 
> would win.
> 
> Say that, in that cycle, B beats A. But B doesn't beat A by 
> very much. B 
> beats A by only 3 votes.
> 
> If A beat B, A would be the BeatsAll winnner, and would win, 
> because we're 
> assuming that the method meets Condorcet's Criterion.
> 
> Those two voters could obviously change the pairwise result 
> between A and B 
> if they voted differently. Let's say that no other pairwise 
> race is close 
> enough for those two voters to influence the outcome of. 
> That's a reasonable 
> assumption.
> 
> If those two voters changed their ballot to A=B>C, then B 
> would only beat A 
> by one vote instead of three votes. I could write an example 
> in which C 
> still wins, whether B beats A by 3 votes or 1 vote. Say it's so.
> 
> If those two voters changed their ballot to A>B>C, that would 
> reverse that 
> pairwise defeat, and A would be BeatsAll winner, and would 
> win. As I said, 
> that's because we're assuming that the method in use is one 
> that meets 
> Condorcet's Criterion.
> 
> By voting A over their favorite, those two voters have 
> improved the outcome 
> for themselves.
> 
> Therefore the method violates FBC. Since the method could be 
> any Condorcet 
> Criterion method, all Condorcet Criterion methods fail FBC.
> 
> Condorcet's Criterion is incompatible with FBC.
> 
> >But, though it isn't insincere [to vote equally in Approval 
> two candidates 
> >between whom you have a preference] , it is contrary to the voter's 
> >interest if s/he unnecessarily votes for someone who isn't 
> really any 
> >better than the person s/he is trying to beat.
> 
> You replied:
> 
> If he rated Kerry as ugly as Bush he would have no problem, even with 
> Plurality.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> Agreed of course.
> 
> You continued:
> 
> My topic here was that to SAY I liked Kerry better than Bush, 
> under Approval 
> I had to SAY I liked him as well as Nader.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> Now you've put your finger on the problem: The problem is if 
> you think that 
> you need to say that you like Kerry better than Bush. That's 
> why I'd much 
> rather have MDDA, MDDB, or MDD,ER-Bucklin(whole) instead of 
> Approval. We're 
> agreed on that. With those good rank methods you can vote Bad 
> over Worse 
> without voting Bad equal to Best. Believe me, for the sake of 
> the country 
> and the world,  I want you to have a good rank method.
> 
> >I'd said:
> >
> >
> >>Of course hopefully they wouldn't keep doing that in 
> Approval, when Nader 
> >>outpolls the Republican, or when they find out what a Democrat is.
> >>
> 
> You reply:
> 
> This is a distraction, for we often have lists of candidates 
> where best, 
> tolerable, and ugly compete.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> So what? If you know that Best has just outpolled Ugliest, 
> then you should 
> know that now you no longer have to vote for Ugly.
> 
> Or if you finally ask yourself why you want to vote for an 
> Ugly, and decide 
> that you don't want to, that would solve the problem too. You 
> aren't going 
> to vote for one of the two uglies again in 2008, are you?
> 
> You continued:
> 
> Further, we often do not have usable popularity ratings.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> That's for sure. We have continuous, consistant and insistant 
> propaganda 
> telling people that they have only two "viable" choices. And 
> when people 
> believe it, if appears self-fulfilling, since the vote totals 
> indeed seem to 
> confirm the propaganda.
> 
> That's a property of Plurality. Any FBC-failing method can 
> have that problem 
> too, under the same conditions.
> 
> You wrote:
> 
> >You're saying that not everyone perceives an acceptable/unacceptable 
> >situation. Maybe. But many do, and they'd do anything to keep an 
> >unacceptable from winning. Actually believing that Kerry was 
> acceptable, 
> >many even voted for him in 2004, though he'd promised to 
> continue and 
> >escalate the Iraq war.
> >
> >Though they no doubt perceived Nader, Kerry, and Bush as being in 3 
> >different merit-categories, they mistakenly believed that 
> Kerry is in the 
> >category of candidates who deserve a vote.
> 
> Our opinions on that particular race should not get in the 
> way of objective 
> thinking.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> You watch someone make the same mistake over and over, and 
> guess what? You 
> pretty much know that he'll make the same mistake next time. 
> There's nothing 
> un-objective about that prediction. For the giveaway 
> progressives, each race 
> is the same, and it's the same giveaway every time.
> 
> You continue:
> 
> Again, often the voter sees more than two ranks of 
> candidates, and when that 
> happens the method needs to support saying so.
> 
> 
> I reply:
> 
> I doubt that there's anyone who wouldn't perceive more than 
> two preference 
> levels, in any reasonable selection of candidates.
> 
> But those finer merit distinctions are unimportant if there 
> is a set of 
> candidates who are completely unacceptable and who could win. 
> Then, whatever 
> the method, a/ua strategy should be used. That strategy is simpler in 
> Approval than in any other method. The trouble is that we 
> don't all agree on 
> what is acceptable. For that reason I'd much rather have a 
> MDDA, MDDB, or 
> MDD,ER-Bucklin(whole) instead of Approval.
> 
> So yes,  a good rank-balloting method is a nice luxury. But 
> when voters are 
> all confused about what is acceptable, or when voters are thoroughly 
> led-by-the-nose regarding who is viable, who is a serious 
> candidate,  and 
> whose policies are closer to what the public wants; and if 
> they're going to 
> ignore it when Approval's vote totals indicate that 
> giveaway-strategy is no 
> longer needed--then yes, a good rank method is a necessity 
> rather than a 
> luxury.
> 
> We don't disagree on that.
> 
> >However, though N>K is their sincere preference, they could 
> regret voting 
> >N>K if it resulted in victory for B, who would have lost if 
> they'd voted 
> >K=N>B. My point was that MDDA isn't going to make people 
> afraid to vote 
> >their sincere preferences.
> 
> You reply:
> 
> Agreed that after counting the ballots we can often picture a 
> different 
> outcome with a different vote.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> How true it is! But that isn't the problem. The problem is 
> that, when a 
> voter perceives an a/ua situation, that voter will use 
> whatever strategy it 
> takes to minimize the probability that an unacceptable will 
> win. Burying 
> one's favorite by voting Kerry, and all the Democrats, over 
> one's favorite 
> is the correct a/ua strategy if you think the Democrats are 
> acceptable. 
> That's why I want a method that meets FBC.
> 
> If we don't agree on what is acceptable, then there's going 
> to be a  lot of 
> disagreement on how to vote, especially when the voting 
> system doesn't meet 
> FBC. It's much worse when the method doesn't meet FBC.
> 
> 
> Assuming liking N>K and
>      Voting N>K gave a worse result than N=K,
>      Who makes a guarantee that a different collection of 
> ballots could not 
> have awarded the win to Bush for voting N=K?
> 
> I reply:
> 
> It would be very rare for your vote to have any effect on the 
> outcome. 
> Therefore, most likely your voting N=K isn't going to help Kerry, as 
> compared to voting N>K. But the probability is beside the 
> point. The fact is 
> that, in methods that don't meet FBC, you have a better 
> chance of helping 
> Kerry beat Bush if you insincerely move Kerry up to 1st 
> place, voting only 
> Kerry in 1st place. In an a/ua situation, if you think Kerry 
> is acceptable 
> and Bush is unacceptable, then you will insincerely vote 
> Kerry in 1st place, 
> over Nader.
> 
> MDDA is much simpler than Condorcet, and is even simpler and more 
> briefly-defined than IRV. And MDDA meets FBC, SFC, and SDSC. 
> There's no need 
> to accept any less in a rank method.
> 
> Mike Ossipoff
> 
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