[EM] Dave: MDDA strategy reply

[Dave Ketchum]

On Wed, 19 Oct 2005 04:48:27 +0000 MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:

 > Dave--
 >
 > You said;
 >
 > Can happen that I desire electing Tom and hate Harry. Further, I am not
 > sure Tom can win so, in case he loses (and only if he loses), I want to do
 > what I can to make sure Dick gets in as my second choice.


Let me expand on this.  There is a race for mayor in a city near here, the
"aroma" is unavoidable and, therefore, if I got to vote, my primary goal
would be that Harry lose (and I do not trust the polls, for I suspect they
work for Harry):

       Assume Tom and Dick are equal in my eyes.  Therefore I would be
happy with Approval and any flavor of Condorcet that permitted =.  IRV is
not too bad, but Plurality is hopeless.

       Or one of my two favorites earns a black eye - not enough to become
a reject like Harry, but enough that I must do all I van to help ny
remaining favorite.  Now IRV (except for spoilers) and Condorcet are fine, 
Approval imposes an intolerable decision, and Plurality remains hopeless.

       Or my falling favorite joins Harry for being unacceptable.  Now any
method that tolerates bullet voting becomes acceptable, including
Plurality and Approval.

Thus Approval beats Plurality, but is not an acceptable destination.
 >
 > You quoted me:
 >
 >
 >>For me, as an individual voter, in the existing political system, Approval
 >>would be fine. It's for other voters that I'd want the benefits of a rank
 >>method. It's for the voters who, with Approval, would insincerely vote
 >>Kerry equal to Nader.
 >>
 >
 > You replied:
 >
 > You seem certain that you will never feel as I describe above, so you
 > consider Approval acceptable.
 >
 > I reply:
 >
 > Not at all. In Approval I'll vote for several candidates if they're
 > acceptable. If one of them can't beat the unacceptables, then maybe 
another
 > one of them will.
 >
 > If Dick is an acceptable candidate, then I'll give an Approval vote to 
Dick,
 > as well as to Tom.
 >
 > But if Dick is unacceptable, then no, I won't give him an Approval vote,
 > even if he is better than Harry.
 >
You seem to consider existence of yellow to be an impossibility 
after labeling red "unacceptable" and green "acceptable".

MANY of us can see more than two colors, and want ballots to comply since 
it is possible.

 > You continued:
 >
 > Many, coming from the Plurality world, would see no reason to care or
 > would see Approval as an acceptable step ahead.
 >
 > I reply:
 >
 > I can't expect Plurality advocates to like the better voting systems.
 >
 > But if you're saying that they'd have an especially difficult time with
 > Approval, then I disagree. Approval is just Plurality done right. 
Plurality
 > without the completely unjustified rule that a voter may only give a point
 > to one candidate, only show support for one candidate.

Seems like you are not responding to what I said - that many of those used 
to Plurality would see what you claim as acceptable and not see a need to 
move farther.
 >
 > You continued:
 >
 > MANY expect to see what I describe above in real life, and therefore
 > consider Approval unacceptable.
 >
 > I reply:
 >
 > For the existing conditions and electorate in our public elections, I'd
 > prefer a voting system that allows voters to vote all of their pairwise
 > preferences, and fully counts them all. Didn't I say that when I told 
why I
 > prefer MDDA to Approval?
 >
 > But you're saying that Plurality advocates won't like Approval because it
 > doesn't allow expression of all our preferences. But does Plurality? :-)
 >
 > You continued:
 >
 > Also, for the day when we find Tom and Dick equally acceptable, many
 > variations of Condorcet and other methods permit equal ranking, leaving
 > Approval no advantage in these cases.
 >
 > I reply:
 >
 > I observed someone, voting in a Condorcet poll, rank Dick over Tom, even
 > though that person preferred Tom to Dick. That peron did that because they
 > felt that Dick had a better chance of beating Harry.
 >
 > Did I tell that person that they had no need to do that in Condorclet? No,
 > because that would have been an untrue statement. Condorcet doesn't
 > guarantee that you won't gain by voting someone over your favorite. 
Approval
 > does make that guarantee, known as FBC.

BUT - Approval does not let me vote Tom preferred to Dick, and BOTH 
preferred to Harry.

Tell me again how voters can improve their odds by voting against their 
desires - at least other than responding to or cooperating with strategy 
plots.

How did we get here?  My topic was equal desire for two candidates.
 >
 > You continued:
 >
 > Also, voting Kerry equal to Nader does not have to be insincerity under
 > Approval - it is the sincere vote when your major desire is to be rid of
 > Bush.
 >
 > I reply:
 >
 > I don't call that insincere in Approval--either in my sincere-voting
 > definition for use with criteria, or in the way I mean sincere voting as
 > voting that votes genuine preferences instead of being strategically
 > intended.
 >
 > But, though it isn't insincere, it is contrary to the voter's interest if
 > s/he unnecessarily votes for someone who isn't really any better than the
 > person s/he is trying to beat.

If he rated Kerry as ugly as Bush he would have no problem, even with 
Plurality.

My topic here was that to SAY I liked Kerry better than Bush, under 
Approval I had to SAY I liked him as well as Nader.
 >
 > You continue:
 >
 > SUMMARY:  This discussion gets complex at best - can we please drop
 > Approval out of it.
 >
 > I reply:
 >
 > No. Approval is a good voting system. We discuss all sorts of voting 
systems
 > here, and Approval is one of them.
 >
 > I'd said:
 >
 >
 >>Of course hopefully they wouldn't keep doing that in Approval, when Nader
 >>outpolls the Republican, or when they find out what a Democrat is.
 >>
This is a distraction, for we often have lists of candidates where best, 
tolerable, and ugly compete.  Further, we often do not have usable 
popularity ratings.
 >
 > You say:
 >
 > This really gets nowhere
 >
 > I reply:
 >
 > What is "this", and where should it be getting that it isn't getting?
 >
 > You continue:
 >
 > - there are often trios of candidates which
 > voters see fitting into separate categories.
 >
 > I reply:
 >
 > You're saying that not everyone perceives an acceptable/unacceptable
 > situation. Maybe. But many do, and they'd do anything to keep an
 > unacceptable from winning. Actually believing that Kerry was acceptable,
 > many even voted for him in 2004, though he'd promised to continue and
 > escalate the Iraq war.
 >
 > Though they no doubt perceived Nader, Kerry, and Bush as being in 3
 > different merit-categories, they mistakenly believed that Kerry is in the
 > category of candidates who deserve a vote.

Our opinions on that particular race should not get in the way of 
objective thinking.

Again, often the voter sees more than two ranks of candidates, and 
when that happens the method needs to support saying so.
 >
 > I'd said:
 >
 >
 >>Obviously N>K is a lot better than N & K.
 >>
 >>No method can completely guarantee to the giveaway voters that N>K 
couldn't
 >>possibly let Kerry when, while N=K wouldn't. But would it take for them to
 >>regret N>K?
 >>
 >
 > You reply:
 >
 > Why are they supposed to regret N>K if that is their sincere desire?
 >
 > I reply:
 >
 > They aren't supposed to, at least I don't say they're supposed to.
 >
 > However, though N>K is their sincere preference, they could regret voting
 > N>K if it resulted in victory for B, who would have lost if they'd voted
 > K=N>B. My point was that MDDA isn't going to make people afraid to vote
 > their sincere preferences.

Agreed that after counting the ballots we can often picture a different 
outcome with a different vote.

Assuming liking N>K and
      Voting N>K gave a worse result than N=K,
      Who makes a guarantee that a different collection of ballots could 
not have awarded the win to Bush for voting N=K?
 >
 > Mike Ossipoff
-- 
   davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
   Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
             Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
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