[EM] Dave: MDDA strategy reply

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Dave--

You said;

Can happen that I desire electing Tom and hate Harry. Further, I am not
sure Tom can win so, in case he loses (and only if he loses), I want to do
what I can to make sure Dick gets in as my second choice.

You quoted me:

>For me, as an individual voter, in the existing political system, Approval 
>would be fine. It's for other voters that I'd want the benefits of a rank 
>method. It's for the voters who, with Approval, would insincerely vote 
>Kerry equal to Nader.

You replied:

You seem certain that you will never feel as I describe above, so you
consider Approval acceptable.

I reply:

Not at all. In Approval I'll vote for several candidates if they're 
acceptable. If one of them can't beat the unacceptables, then maybe another 
one of them will.

If Dick is an acceptable candidate, then I'll give an Approval vote to Dick, 
as well as to Tom.

But if Dick is unacceptable, then no, I won't give him an Approval vote, 
even if he is better than Harry.

You continued:

Many, coming from the Plurality world, would see no reason to care or
would see Approval as an acceptable step ahead.

I reply:

I can't expect Plurality advocates to like the better voting systems.

But if you're saying that they'd have an especially difficult time with 
Approval, then I disagree. Approval is just Plurality done right. Plurality 
without the completely unjustified rule that a voter may only give a point 
to one candidate, only show support for one candidate.

You continued:

MANY expect to see what I describe above in real life, and therefore
consider Approval unacceptable.

I reply:

For the existing conditions and electorate in our public elections, I'd 
prefer a voting system that allows voters to vote all of their pairwise 
preferences, and fully counts them all. Didn't I say that when I told why I 
prefer MDDA to Approval?

But you're saying that Plurality advocates won't like Approval because it 
doesn't allow expression of all our preferences. But does Plurality? :-)

You continued:

Also, for the day when we find Tom and Dick equally acceptable, many
variations of Condorcet and other methods permit equal ranking, leaving
Approval no advantage in these cases.

I reply:

I observed someone, voting in a Condorcet poll, rank Dick over Tom, even 
though that person preferred Tom to Dick. That peron did that because they 
felt that Dick had a better chance of beating Harry.

Did I tell that person that they had no need to do that in Condorclet? No, 
because that would have been an untrue statement. Condorcet doesn't 
guarantee that you won't gain by voting someone over your favorite. Approval 
does make that guarantee, known as FBC.

You continued:

Also, voting Kerry equal to Nader does not have to be insincerity under
Approval - it is the sincere vote when your major desire is to be rid of 
Bush.

I reply:

I don't call that insincere in Approval--either in my sincere-voting 
definition for use with criteria, or in the way I mean sincere voting as 
voting that votes genuine preferences instead of being strategically 
intended.

But, though it isn't insincere, it is contrary to the voter's interest if 
s/he unnecessarily votes for someone who isn't really any better than the 
person s/he is trying to beat.

You continue:

SUMMARY:  This discussion gets complex at best - can we please drop
Approval out of it.

I reply:

No. Approval is a good voting system. We discuss all sorts of voting systems 
here, and Approval is one of them.

I'd said:

>
>Of course hopefully they wouldn't keep doing that in Approval, when Nader 
>outpolls the Republican, or when they find out what a Democrat is.

You say:

This really gets nowhere

I reply:

What is "this", and where should it be getting that it isn't getting?

You continue:

- there are often trios of candidates which
voters see fitting into separate categories.

I reply:

You're saying that not everyone perceives an acceptable/unacceptable 
situation. Maybe. But many do, and they'd do anything to keep an 
unacceptable from winning. Actually believing that Kerry was acceptable, 
many even voted for him in 2004, though he'd promised to continue and 
escalate the Iraq war.

Though they no doubt perceived Nader, Kerry, and Bush as being in 3 
different merit-categories, they mistakenly believed that Kerry is in the 
category of candidates who deserve a vote.

I'd said:

>Obviously N>K is a lot better than N & K.
>
>No method can completely guarantee to the giveaway voters that N>K couldn't 
>possibly let Kerry when, while N=K wouldn't. But would it take for them to 
>regret N>K?

You reply:

Why are they supposed to regret N>K if that is their sincere desire?

I reply:

They aren't supposed to, at least I don't say they're supposed to.

However, though N>K is their sincere preference, they could regret voting 
N>K if it resulted in victory for B, who would have lost if they'd voted 
K=N>B. My point was that MDDA isn't going to make people afraid to vote 
their sincere preferences.

Mike Ossipoff

_________________________________________________________________
On the road to retirement? Check out MSN Life Events for advice on how to 
get there! http://lifeevents.msn.com/category.aspx?cid=Retirement