[EM] MDD,ER-Bucklin (whole)

[Kevin Venzke]

Chris,

--- Chris Benham <chrisbenham at bigpond.com> a écrit :
> The method meets  FBC/Sincere Favourite, Majority for solid 
> coalitions/Mutual Majority, the Plurality criterion, Smith(Gross), SFC
> (and GSFC?).

I don't know how to prove that a method satisfies GSFC.

What's the argument for Smith(gross)? I don't think it satisfies it. Suppose
the majority-strength wins are A>B>C>A, ABC>D, ABC>E, so that the Smith(gross)
set is {a,b,c}. MDD will try to disqualify every candidate, but can't, since 
no one would be left. So in this case MDD,ERBW behaves just like ERBW. Can it
be shown that ERBW won't elect D or E in this scenario?

Kevin Venzke



	

	
		
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Appel audio GRATUIT partout dans le monde avec le nouveau Yahoo! Messenger 
Téléchargez cette version sur http://fr.messenger.yahoo.com