[EM] (not totally successful) attempt to summarize MDDA, DMC, ICA

[Abd ulRahman Lomax]

At 01:44 PM 10/14/2005, Warren Smith wrote:
>Finally, consider what I call the "DH3 scenario"
>    http://math.temple.edu/~wds/crv/DH3.html .
>This is a horribly-common and horribly-severe problem that Borda and 
>all Condorcet methods
based on full-ranking-ballots suffer from in the presence of strategic voters.

Reading the scenario, I'm struck by how utterly unlikely it seems 
that voters would actually behave in the way described. Essentially, 
if practically the entire electorate decides to go on an exaggeration 
binge, a bad outcome could occur. Well, duh!

On what basis is the claim made that this problem is not only common, 
when on the face of it it seems that it would be extremely rare, but 
it is "horribly-common"?

What does "horribly-common" mean? From the meaning of "common," I'd 
have to assume that "horribly-common" means "practically all the time."

I've been noticing lately the tendencies of a certain IRV supporter 
who claims that IRV will eliminate negative campaigning, with no 
significant substantiation, and yet his habits include a highly 
negative portrayal of not only competing election methods, but also 
of anyone who disagrees with him on practically anything.

And now we have a student of election methods who would presumably 
like to see sincere rankings and ratings in elections, but who is 
prone to exaggeration when it comes to comparing election methods.

I guess it is not surprising. After all, if we don't exaggerate, our 
favorite election method might not win.