[EM] ICA and DH3

[Kevin Venzke]

Warren,

--- Warren Smith <wds at math.temple.edu> a écrit :
> (Enough acronyms for you?)  The biggest problem I have with it is
> DH3 failure but DMC and ICA also fail DH3.   

If you feel ICA fails DH3, I guess that you mean DH3 to be a measure 
of idiot-proofness. In ICA you can't rank the worse frontrunner strictly
last without approving every other candidate. Even if this succeeds in
defeating this frontrunner, your ballot is still impotent to decide
which of the other candidates wins. You're probably giving the election
to the dark horse candidate with the most supporters.

Take a scenario like this:

45 A
48 B
7 C

B wins. If the A voters vote A>C, it already backfires and elects C.
In order to work, and not backfire, C needs to get (49-7=)42 votes from A
voters, but also get no more than (44-7=)37 approval from the same voters.
That's impossible.

It could only work if the A voters expect A to receive some approval from 
the B voters. But I think it's unlikely that many voters will approve both 
of the two frontrunners. And it certainly doesn't seem safe to assume that
you can bury a candidate, and let *their* supporters ensure that you beat
the dark horse.

This scenario seems to work out the same with WV methods.

Kevin Venzke



	

	
		
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