[EM] Paul: Your ramblings about sincerity

Tue Oct 11 18:43:35 PDT 2005

I specifically quoted your email where you said "my definition only applies
to my criterion". 

You did not answer that question, instead you now claim that your definition
is in fact, universal.

Make up your mind, or at least stop trying to confuse me. 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: election-methods-bounces at electorama.com 
> [mailto:election-methods-bounces at electorama.com] On Behalf Of 
> MIKE OSSIPOFF
> Sent: Tuesday, October 11, 2005 7:05 PM
> To: election-methods at electorama.com
> Subject: [EM] Paul: Your ramblings about sincerity
> 
> 
> Paul Kislanko says:
> 
> If your definition is not universally applicable, don't 
> expect laymen to
> accept it.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> What do you mean by universally applicable? My criteria and 
> their supporting 
> definitions are universally applicable in the sense that they 
> apply to all 
> methods.
> 
> The usefulness of that definition is that the voting that it 
> calls sincere 
> is voting that is not being strategically coerced. When that useful 
> interpretation is applied to your intransitive voter, it 
> could be unfairly 
> accusing the voting system of coercing strategy from that 
> voter, when all 
> that's reallly happening is that the combination of voting system and 
> intransitive preferences is not giving the voter a 
> non-falsified way of 
> voting.
> 
> So that's the only failing of the definition: Unfairness to 
> the method if 
> you apply it when the voter's preferences are intransitive. 
> For one thing, 
> you needn't so apply it. For another thing, the problem never 
> comes up, 
> since the only result is that your intransitive-preferences 
> example is not 
> an example that tests a method by my criteria. And that isn't 
> a problem 
> since a failure-example-writer can write an example that doesn't have 
> intransitive preferences. And all it takes is one failure example to 
> establish that a method fails a criterion.
> 
> Some of my criteria stipulate sincere voting by at least some 
> voters. If you 
> write an example in which those voters have intransitive 
> preferences, then, 
> as Jobst showed, they have no sincere way of voting, by my 
> definition of 
> sincere voting. That means that that example that you've 
> written fails the 
> premise conditions of my criterion.
> 
> All that means is that your example doesn't test methods by 
> my criterion. 
> Your example doesn't demonstate anything about any voting system's 
> compliance with my criterion. No voting system can be shown 
> to fail my 
> criterion by using your example, because a failure example 
> must meet the 
> criterion's premise conditions.
> 
> But that isn't a problem. Sure,  you can write an example 
> with intransitive 
> preferences, and say that Plurality doesn't fail GSFC or Condorcet's 
> Criterion in that example, because the criterion says nothing 
> about your 
> example. So what? I'll just write an example with transitive 
> preferences, 
> and, if it's written so as to meet all of the criterion's premise 
> conditions, then the criterion will apply to it, and, if I've 
> written it 
> well, it will show Plurality failing GSFC or Condorcet's Criterion.
> 
> Yes, intransitve preferences are possible, when there are 
> several different 
> measures used for judging things. That could easily be true 
> of someone's 
> preference among candidates.
> 
> You may think that it's inelegant for a criterion to not apply to all 
> examples, but of course it's routine that they don't. That's 
> what premise 
> conditions are for--to separate the examples that the 
> criterion applies to 
> from the examples that it doesn't apply to.
> 
> Not applying to examples with intransitive preferences isn't 
> a problem at 
> all, because an example-writer can write an example without 
> intransitive 
> preferences. After all, transtive preferences aren't implausible.
> 
> As for whether peoiple will accept a definition that doesn't 
> apply to an 
> unusual kind of preferences, most people don't really have a 
> lot of concern 
> about intranstive preferences, and so they aren't likely to object.
> 
> Besides, I don't ask people to accept my definition of 
> sincere voting as a 
> way to evaluate the honesty of a voter. As I already said, my 
> sincere voting 
> definition is strictly for use with my criteria.
> 
> You continued:
> 
> And no, no voter should have to explain anything to you about the
> failure of your definitions.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> I was joking, Paul. The fact that, with my sincere voting 
> defintiion, my 
> criteria don't apply to someone with intransitive preferences 
> is not a 
> failure of my definition or criteria. The fact that you can't 
> drive your car 
> across the bay without a bridge is not a failure of your car. 
> It goes where 
> it's needed to go, and needn't go everywhere.
> 
> No voter should have to explain anything to me about the fact 
> that that 
> definition doesn't apply to their intransitive preferences, 
> but I owe that 
> voter no apology for calling her insincere, because I've 
> already said, more 
> than once, that that definition is only intended for use with 
> my criteria, 
> not as a way of characterizing a voter's intentions or honesty.
> 
> You continue:
> 
> If your method can't accomodate us voters'
> intransivities, it is not one we need to talk about or be 
> bothered with.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> I agree that you needn't talk about it or be bothered by it. 
> And yet you 
> seem terribly bothered by it, and are talking about it.
> 
> I didn't mean to imply that someone should be bothered by 
> that definition. 
> Quite the contrary.
> 
> The fact that it's difficult to not contradict yourself when your 
> preferences are intransitive is not the fault of that 
> definition. It's 
> something that you just have to expect when you have intransitive 
> preferences.
> 
> You seem to want it to be my fault, or the fault of my 
> definition, that a 
> voter with intransitive preferences can't avoid falsifying a 
> preference on 
> an Approval ballot. No, I'd say that it's completely 
> reasonable to not call 
> a ballot sincere if it falsifies a preference, even if the voter's 
> preferences are such as to make that unavoidable. The only 
> unfairness there 
> is if you use my sincerity definition to accuse the method of 
> coercing 
> strategy from that intransitive voter.
> 
> No, it doesn't mean that the voter is a dishonest person, if 
> falsification 
> is unavoidable under those conditions. But  a false 
> preference needn't be 
> called sincere voting. The fact that my sincere voting 
> defintion doesn't 
> call that sincere is not a fault of that definition.
> 
> You continue:
> 
> Let's just leave it at your criteria isn't applicable to 
> practical voting
> methods.
> 
> I replyi:
> 
> Speaking of mismatch and inapplicability, you've used a 
> pluaral noun with a 
> singular verb. Did you mean that my criteria aren't 
> applicable...or that my 
> criterion isn't applicable...?
> 
> But you forgot to share with us what practical voting system 
> you believe 
> that one or more of my criteria isn't applicable to.
> 
> By the way, if you'd turn down the volume, I'd reply to you 
> more often. But 
> you're consistently such a loud twit, always spouting off 
> with no clue about 
> what you're saying, that the fact is that when I ignore your 
> postings, no 
> one will think that I'm evading a valid criticism.
> 
> I'm making an exception this time, because it's worthwhile to 
> clarify this 
> matter for others, because this is the first time, in a long 
> time, that 
> someone pointed out something unexpected about one of my 
> criteria or their 
> supporting definitions, something that could be mistaken for 
> a problem if I 
> didn't answer it.
> 
> But it is not a failure of that definition. And it is not that the 
> definition doesn't apply to that voter or wrongly 
> characterizes her voting. 
> It's not unfair to not call a ballot sincere when it 
> falsifies a preference, 
> regardless of whether or not it's intentional or the voter's fault.
> 
> But, as I said, the matter of fairness to the voter's 
> reputation for honesty 
> isn't relevant anyway, because, as I said, that definiition 
> is intended only 
> for use with my criteria, not for describing or evalutating people's 
> honesty.
> 
> My sincerity definition meaningfully describes voting that 
> hasn't been 
> coerced by strategic need. The fact that it can fail to find 
> that desirable 
> circumstance when the voter's preferences are intransitive 
> doesn't negate 
> the definition's value. Especially since the only result is 
> that such an 
> example merely isn't looked at by my criteria.
> 
> Mike Ossipoff
> 
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