[EM] A more briefly-defined method with the best mix of properties

[Kevin Venzke]

Hello,

--- Araucaria Araucana <araucaria.araucana at gmail.com> a écrit :
> Please use my public alias in web-visible correspondence.
> 
> Kevin Venzke <stepjak <at> yahoo.fr> writes:
> >      http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Majority_Defeat_Disqualification_Approval
> > 
> > I guess you didn't check to see that this page already has been written?
> > 
> 
> You're right, I did not.  And the rules are quite simple, simpler even than DMC.
>  I did see the original posting but not Mike's renaming.
> 
> My goal was to see if Mike was willing to do a bit of legwork if he was going to
> add another voice to the Condorcet group.  But you've already done the work for
> him :-(.

It won't work, since discussion of non-Condorcet methods is discouraged on the
Condorcet group.

Anyway, Mike has put a lot more time into writing about MDDA than I have.

> As you said in your original post, this fails some offensive strategy incentives
> (and plurality), and is of course not Condorcet compliant.  But still a very
> interesting demonstration.

I think you've misread me. I was only criticizing the vulnerability to offensive
strategy when the approval cutoff can be placed (i.e. when you can rank among
disapproved candidates).

Plurality? I don't have a proof that MDDA satisfies Plurality, but I have no
reason to suspect that it fails it.

Kevin Venzke



	

	
		
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