[EM] Re: Rob: MDDA vs BeatpathWinner

[Paul Kislanko]

All of the gobblydegoog aside, to Rob - we don't care what you want, us
voters want to NOT have to rank all altertantives. I want to list only the
ones I find acceptable in the order I prefer them. Any method that
"encourages" me to rank all alterntatives whether I know anything about them
or care about them will just encourage me to not vote.  

> -----Original Message-----
> From: election-methods-electorama.com-bounces at electorama.com 
> [mailto:election-methods-electorama.com-bounces at electorama.com
] On Behalf Of MIKE OSSIPOFF
> Sent: Saturday, October 08, 2005 8:50 PM
> To: election-methods at electorama.com
> Subject: [EM] Re: Rob: MDDA vs BeatpathWinner
> 
> 
> Rob--
> 
> You wrote:
> 
> The one major objection I have [to MDDA] is the lack of
> truncation resistance - I really hope we can find a system that
> encourages a full ranking.  It seems that MDDA would tend to 
> discourage
> ranking anyone below a plausible frontrunner, if I understand it
> correctly.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> Not necessarily. For the person who needs and wants to make 
> use of FBC 
> compliance, then yes, that person will equal-top-rank the 
> acceptables, and 
> power truncate the unacceptables. If power truncation isn't 
> available, then 
> s/he will truncate them or rank them in reverse order of winnability.
> 
> Likewise, s/he'd sometimes rank the unacceptables in reverse order of 
> winnability in BeatpathWinner, if offensive-order-reversal 
> deterrence isn't 
> the primary consideration. S/he must judge if offensive 
> order-reversal is a 
> threat, and, based on that, whether to truncate or 
> strategically rank. With 
> MDDA there similarly would be a choice between truncation and 
> strategic 
> ranking. Truncate if you think you can best beat all the 
> unacceptables in 
> the Approval count. Strategically rank if you think you can 
> best beat them 
> all by making majority defeats against eachother. With power 
> truncation you 
> don't have that concern: Just power truncate them. Much simpler than 
> BeatpathWinner or unenhanced MDDA).
> 
> But I'm saying that SFC compliance is for the person who 
> doesn't need FBC, 
> for the sincere voter. If you believe you're in a 
> sincere-voting majority, 
> then you can freely rank all the candidates, and you're 
> assured that no one 
> that your majority like less than the CW will win. That 
> doesn't require any 
> truncation, or any kind of strategy.
> 
> So it isn't that MDDA forces you to truncate. It depends on which 
> criterion-compliance you want to use, which kind of strategy 
> you want to 
> use, what kind of a voter you are. The two kinds of strategy, 
> the mix of 
> criterion-compliances, makes MDDA more versatile than BeatpathWinner.
> 
> You continued:
> 
> I'd also really like to rename SFC to something that is more 
> descriptive
> of what's measured.  If a system encourages truncation, it can't
> truthfully be called "strategy free".
> 
> I reply:
> 
> I haven't named MDDA "Strategy-Free". When Kevin devised and 
> introduced 
> MDDA, we agreed on the name MDDA.
> 
> But MDDA is indeed strategy-free for a majority with the 
> conditions and goal 
> described in SFC. SFC describes condidtions under which a 
> majority can 
> ensure that no one worse than the CW wins, without using any 
> strategy, with 
> complying methods. So yes, SFC is about strategy-freeness, where it's 
> possible.
> 
> 
> Such subjective titles don't
> serve us well anyway.  "Majority Pairwise Winner" would be an accurate
> and suitable name, but certainly not the only one.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> The words strategy-free describe SFC's guarantee. 
> Strategy-freeness where 
> it's possible.
> 
> You continued:
> 
> I've contemplated
> "Majority Condorcet Winner", but using "Condorcet" in the name isn't
> helpful, since I don't think Condorcet ever proposed anything 
> like that.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> That Condorcet didn't propose SFC, or a name for it, doesn't 
> mean that it 
> wouldn't be appropriate to name SFC for its protection of CWs, or its 
> relation to the Condorcet Criterion.
> 
> I sometimes refer to SFC as Condorcet's Criterion for 
> majorities. And I 
> sometimes refer to GSFC as the Smith Criterion for majorities.
> 
> I have no objection to those names in the paragraph before 
> this one.  If 
> others prefer them, I'd be glad to use them. Then, I'd capitalize 
> "Majorities", so the criteria would be "Condorcet's Criterion for 
> Majorities" and "The Smith Criterion for Majorities".
> 
> But I feel that "Strategy-Free Criterion" describes what 
> makes them the 
> pinnacle of the promise of rank-balloting.
> 
> Mike Ossipoff
> 
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