[EM] Alternative SFC wording

[Rob Lanphier]

On Thu, 2005-10-06 at 14:41 -0500, Ken Kuhlman wrote:
> I still have a hard time seeing the value of this criterion.
> 
> A profile is a profile.  It doesn't matter if the reason for the votes
> was honest, strategic, or if the voter's mothers told them what to do.
>   Once the votes are cast, a criterion helps determine who can &
> cannot reasonable win.
> 
> So both the original definition and this revised one seem to reduce to
> the Smith criterion.

Not quite.  SFC is a weaker criterion that allows for picking outside of
the Smith set when there's no candidate who wins all pairwise
races /with a majority of votes/.  Many of the weird problems with
Smith-compliant methods come when many of the winner's pairwise
victories are plurality-only victories (e.g. A wins where 20 votes were
"A>B", 10 votes were "B>A", and 70 votes were "A=B").  It's easier to
dismiss the sanctity of A's victory over B when 70 voters say "I don't
care"; thus, it's useful to have a criterion that makes an exception for
this case.

Rob

> On 10/5/05, MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com> wrote:
> > For SFC-complying methods, if falsification doesn't occur on a
> > results-changing scale:
> >
> > Any sincere-voting majority is guaranteed that no one whom they all like
> > less than the CW will win.
> >
> > [end of alternative SFC definition]
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