[EM] sincerity in range votes / and fantasies

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 05:28 PM 10/4/2005, Rob Lanphier wrote:
>I've seen a lot of different definitions of the "majority criterion",
>but for purposes of this email, I'll describe a minimal version:
>"If a strict majority of the voters rank a particular alternative as
>their unique first choice, then the voting method must select that
>alternative as a unique winner" (Anderson, 1994)
>
>This seems like a very minimal litmus test for mainstream acceptability
>of a voting system.  Plurality, IRV, and all Condorcet variants meet it.
>Approval arguably meets it, in that the only way to "rank" a single
>candidate as a unique first choice is to bullet vote.  Range does not.

Range does not because it allows the voter additional freedom. The 
key word here is "rank." By defining the criterion violation through 
"ranking" rather than through "preference" -- which might be 
unexpressed because of the limitations of the voting system, yes, 
Range does not pass that criterion, and you can be sure this will be 
used against it. However, the same argument will be made against 
Approval, the difference is that the opponents will substitute 
"prefer" for "rank." And the argument will have the same impact, and 
it will need to be similarly addressed.

I have recently been considering and writing about two modified 
versions of Approval, which posts have not gone to the Approval 
Voting list I was banned by the moderator for no specified violation 
of any established rule, not even "don't post unless I permit you."

Those versions are what I've called A+, which is simply Approval 
voting "plus" an expression of favorite, which, in basic A+ does not 
affect the election outcome, but which *would* affect such far from 
irrelevant matters as the ability of voters to express a preference, 
the assignment of public campaign finance money, and perhaps ballot 
position in succeeding elections.

A+ *is* basic Approval as an election method, but A+, obviously, 
would fail the majority criterion. Now, if basic Approval is 
considered to satisfy the majority criterion, and A+ fails it, then 
surely the difference is only apparent and not real. Approval appears 
to satisfy the criterion only because ranking information is concealed.

If, however, one wants to satisfy the criterion, then one could take 
the same ballot as A+ and *use* the information. Essentially the 
ballot becomes a truncated Condorcet ballot, with only three ranks, 
which I've called Favorite, Preferred [over unmarked], and Not 
Preferred [unmarked].

The election is counted pairwise, and the Favorite vote is considered 
the same as a Preferred vote, *except* in the pairwise contest 
between a Favorite and a Preferred candidate, in which case the 
Favorite is used.

This method satisfies the Condorcet criterion and the majority 
criterion. Yet it is Approval with respect to all other candidates 
except the Favorite. Because the very simple ballot forces ranking to 
express Approval (any ranked candidate is presumed approved), methods 
like DMC can be used to determine the winner if there is a Condorcet 
cycle. I originally proposed that the winner be the most-approved 
candidate in the Smith set, but there may be problems with this, 
about which I am unsure.

What I think interesting is that A+ could easily become A+PW (the 
acronym, which irritates some, means Approval Plus, counted 
PairWise). The ballot stays the same. Or additional ranks could be 
added; once you have done two, three should get easier. Or, if the 
ballot complication problem can be overcome, Range could be an 
evolutionary step.

Indeed, theoretically, one might be able to get A+ implemented where 
the Approval votes are not counted.... I.e., the election method 
remains plurality, and the counting of the Approval votes might be at 
private expense (anyone who wants to do it). I think this would lead 
to real Approval voting in a flash!

But this also suggests something for Range, we could call it R+. This 
would be range with the expression of a favorite. That addition, I 
think, is going to be necessary if Range is to be implemented in 
general elections, where ballot position and campaign financing are 
real issues. Whether or not this additional information is actually 
used is a separate question.

By the way, also, normalization is really necessary in the 
justification of Range as a one-person, one-vote method. What it 
boils down to is that Range allows a person one vote at the most in 
any pairwise election, same as Approval. Range allows voters to 
weaken their vote, but not to strengthen it beyond that. These 
weakened votes create an impression of majority criterion failure, 
but if "ranked above all others" means that one full vote has been 
cast for the candidate, there are no weakened votes cast by that 
majority, and the candidate will win unless there are *more* such 
votes cast for another candidate. "Majority" criterion, if Approval 
is considered to pass, could not mean "majority" only, but must mean 
"more than any other" as well. Otherwise Approval fails.



>Incidentally, Range voting wouldn't have prevented slavery.  Black
>suffrage was a pretty important prerequisite which didn't exist back
>then.  Also, I don't think that a bunch of people who were willing to
>secede from the union and fight a war on their own soil would express a
>mild preference for slavery in a Range vote.
>
>I honestly can't believe I'm rewarding your ad hominem attack with a
>response.  I'll endeavor not to make the same mistake twice.
>
>Rob
>
>Footnote:
>Anderson, 1994: Research draft by L. Bruce Anderson titled "How To Take
>Votes: New Ideas on Better Ways to Determine the Winners", March, 1994.
>
>
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