[EM] Can ranking improve on Approval? MDDA strategy.

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

For me, as an individual voter, in the existing political system, Approval 
would be fine. It's for other voters that I'd want the benefits of a rank 
method. It's for the voters who, with Approval, would insincerely vote Kerry 
equal to Nader.

Of course hopefully they wouldn't keep doing that in Approval, when Nader 
outpolls the Republican, or when they find out what a Democrat is.

The need for better voting systems has to do with things that we don't want 
voters to (believe that they) have to do.

We don't want them to vote an undesirable over their favorite. That's the 
worst, because they aren't showing any support for their favorite. 
Fortunately it's possible to guarantee that that won't be necessary.

Less important, we don't want them to incincerely vote an undesirable equal 
to their favorite. Because the freedom from that need isn't essential, 
Approval & RV would be good to have. But wouldn't it be nice if, even in the 
1st election with the new method, voters didn't feel comelled to vote a 
lesser-evil equal to their favorite? That's how a rank method could improve 
on Approval. But it would have to be a good rank method. It would have to 
meet FBC, to avoid the worst kind of LO2E giveaway.

Of course that latter benefit cannot be guaranteed, but one can still do 
much to make people willing to vote Kerry below Nader. That's what this 
posting is about.

RV, by the way, would likely encourage giveaway-progressives to give a 
little less to Kerry than to Nader. But I hope that a good rank method would 
let them _fully_ vote Nader over Kerry.

Compare how giveaway and particular progressives would vote in Approval and 
MDDA:

The candidates are: Nader (N), Kerry (K), and Bush (B):

Approval:

Givaway: NK
Particular: N

MDDA:

Giveaway: N>K
Particular: N

Obviously N>K is a lot better than N & K.

No method can completely guarantee to the giveaway voters that N>K couldn't 
possibly let Kerry when, while N=K wouldn't. But would it take for them to 
regret N>K?

If N>K completes a majority against Kerry, then it must be that Nader has 
majority, which means that Nader also has a majority against Bush. So the 
giveaway progressives have nothing to lose by voting N>K.  Unless there's 
offensive order-reversal by the Bush voters. But offensive order-reversal is 
very well deterred by the fact that if they Bush voters ranked Nader, they'd 
be giving an Approval vote to Nader. The giveaway progressives have nothing 
to fear by voting N>K.

N>K is an improvement over N & K. MDDA, then, does improve on Approval.

So  MDDA meets that more important requirement, FBC, and also does ok with 
the 2nd desideratum, that voters not be strategically forced to vote 
Kerry=Nader.

Of course, whether the method is Approval, RV, Condorcet or MDDA, the fact 
that those progressives who are particular refuse to help the Democrook 
means that the Democrook might not be able to get a majority against the 
Republican, and might thereby lose to him. That's ok, because he doesn't 
deserve being helped to win.

MDDA and Condorcet both share the fact that offensive order-reversal could 
defeat a CW. But both deter offensive order-reversalvery well. In MDDA that 
deterrence is automatic.

With Approval, RV, Condorcet and MDDA, it's necessary to vote down to the CW 
if one wants to help him/her win.

In MDDA and Condorcet a Kerry>Bush majority is enforced. That's what makes 
those rank methods work.

In MDDA majority is enforced by SFC. All that's needed for that enforcement 
is that there isn't a majority-strength circular tie, or large-scale 
offensvie order-reversal. Both of those two problems are unlikely, and so 
MDDA's SFC majority-enforcement is very good.

Condorcet has added enforcements. In addition to SFC, it has GSFC, MMC, 
Condorcet's Criterion and the Smith Criterion.

GSFC makes a difference if there is a majority-strength circular tie. MMC, 
the Mutual Majority Criterion, helps when the premise conditions of SFC and 
GSFC don't apply, but there is a mutual majority. Condorcet's Criterion and 
the Smith Criterion are helpful if Compromise>Worst isn't a majority defeat, 
but everyone, including your opponents, votes sincerely.

It might seem that Condorcet has better majority-enforcement, because it has 
GSFC, MMC, CC, & SC. But majority circular ties and offensive order-reversal 
are unlikely, meaning that nothing more than SFC is needed. A mutual 
majority is a fortuitous special case, unlike the general and plausible 
premise conditions of SFC. And the assumption that your opponents will vote 
sincerely isn't too realistic either.

So SFC is much better than those other criteria, and MDDA's 
majority-enforcement is effectively just as good as that of Condorcet.

Strategy in MDDA? Unless a candidate is too disgusting to vote for, such as 
Kerry, Dean, or other Democrats, rank at least down to the expected CW. If 
the CW is in doubt, then overshoot, just to be on the safe side. If you 
aren't sure, you could even rank all the way down to your 2nd to last 
choice.

Same in Condorcet, of course, except that you want to try to not rank past 
the CW if there's a danger of offensive order-reversal.

In MDDA, the approval-count has two purposes (or maybe more): 1) It's a 
simple solution for when there are more than one undisqualified candidate; 
and 2) It deters offensive order-reversal.

So, to answer the question in the subject line: Yes, a good rank method can 
improve on Approval and RV.

I emphasize that I'm speaking from the position that we look at bare 
preferences, which is what most of us are used to. Looking at it that way, 
these good rank methods are majoritarian and Approval isn't. But of course 
bare preferences aren't the only way to look at it. RV's ranges, and the 
emphatic preferences that Approval counts are valid too.

My preference for MDDA over RV and Approval in public elections results from 
the standard of bare preferences as oppposed to emphatic preferences and 
ratings. That's an individual subjective matter, and I'm not saying that 
Approval and RV aren't as good in an objective sense.

Now, what if all the progressives made better judgements about who is good 
enough to vote over their favorite? Then FBC wouldn't be so necessary. Then, 
for public political elections, SSD's slightly augmented 
majority-enforcement, with GSFC, MMC, Smith Criterion and Condorcet 
Criterion, would make it the best method. (By the standard of bare, or 
ordinary, preferences).

I consider SSD to be the ideal best for public political elections, when 
there isn't a serious lesser-of-2-evils problem, because progrssives 
understand who is and isn't good enough to vote over their favorite, or 
because the greater-evils have been voted out of the political system.

But in the meantime I consider MDDA the best, disregarding winnability.

Considering winnability, RV and Approval are the best, with RV seeming more 
winnable than Approval, and somewhat better results-wise than Approval

Mike Ossipoff

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