[EM] Does MDDA really satisfy FBC?
Warren Smith
wds at math.temple.edu
Tue Oct 11 11:04:26 PDT 2005
MDDA fails "add top". That is, if you add some identical honest votes ranking A top,
that can harm A (e.g. by creating a Condorcet winner [who is not A]
who then wins, whereas previously there was a Condorcet cycle and A was the winner
on approval counts).
Now this may not technically count as an FBC failure, because I daresay there
exists some way to rank A top and dishonestly order the remaining candidates,
which still leaves A the winner. However, in practice, it may have a very similar
effect to FBC failure.
In particular, conceivably Deluxe MDDA will still lead
to 2-party domination. (I have not looked into this difficult question. I am just
saying, it is not obvious.) Some of these remarks also apply to the "DMC"
deluxe voting method.
wds
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