[EM] thoughts on the pairwise matrix

Rob Brown rob at karmatics.com
Mon Nov 28 14:30:44 PST 2005

Paul Kislanko <kislanko <at> airmail.net> writes:
>> what kind of information is lost when going from ballots to the 
>> matrix?
> The relative positions on ballots compared to the whole field 
> of alternatives. Alternative A ranked first, and E ranked fifth
> is cancelled by an E ranked fourth and A ranked fifth. The 
> Condorcet methods that translate the Pairwise Matrix into 
> an ordered list make no distinction based upon voter preferences
> as indicated by ballots, since their "raw data" is the 
> "pre-processed" matrix.

Isn't the fact that Condorcet methods ignore ballot positions relative to 
the "whole field of alternatives" the whole beauty of what Condorcet
methods do?

It seems like that is the major selling point of Condorcet:  "In the 
contest between Gore and Bush, we intentionally ignore Gore's position 
relative to Nader on your ballot.  Therefore you can vote sincerely and 
without punishing the candidate you like that is most likely to win."

As soon as you start taking into account positions relative to all 
alternatives, you have destroyed the "elimination/minimization of 
strategy" benefit of Condorcet.


More information about the Election-Methods mailing list