[EM] clones and FBC - a very interesting conjecture

Warren Smith wds at math.temple.edu
Sat Nov 19 10:08:12 PST 2005

thinking about it, it may be that Range Voting (and its variants) is the ONLY FBC-obeying
voting method which is immune to candidate-cloning (with voters assumed to have slight
preferences among the clones) and disregarding non-deterministic election methods.

That would be a very interesting theorem.  I wonder if it is true.  Note that it is essential 
here that the score range be a CONTINUUM.
Range voting with discrete score set like {1,2,3,4,5} is vulnerable to cloning
if the voters decie to non-equally score clones, but with continuum scores 
with the voters assumes to make arbitrarily small score perturbations, range is
generically immune.

More information about the Election-Methods mailing list