[EM] Survey of voting methods obeying Mike Ossipoff's "Favorite Betrayal Criterion"

Warren Smith wds at math.temple.edu
Fri Nov 18 18:40:43 PST 2005

now available at


We've come a long way since
the days when range and approval voting were the only known methods
in which betraying your favorite is strategically avoidable.
Now many other methods also are known with that property;
many of them were invented by Kevin Venzke.  

However, it appears Range and Approval satisfy FBC in a stronger and more
obvious sense than these other methods.  Specifically, with Range and Approval,
betraying your favorite simply never is useful.  With the other methods
it _can_ be strategically useful (cause X to win instead of Y, where the betrayers
prefer X) _but_ if so there is always a way to get the same effect (i.e. make X win) 
by some other dishonest vote _not_ involving favorite betrayal.

(survey by Mike Ossipoff & WDS)

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