[EM] Re: majority rule, mutinous pirates, and voterstrategy

Stephane Rouillon stephane.rouillon at sympatico.ca
Mon May 30 20:01:15 PDT 2005

> Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a écrit :
> > [...] You may
> > increase meeting efficiency by excluding minority factions, but at the cost
> > of potentially excluding them in deliberations toward consensus.

This is not necessary. The efficiency aspect can be treated after the
representation exercise. Many politicians only want voters to see
that problem as a trade-off: more representation = less stability
and efficiency; less representation = more stability and efficiency. I disagree.
Taking any electoral system, one can, in the case of an unstable chamber (I
consider bipartite coalitions as stable, but take a minoritarian government if
you want) build a stable chamber that would preserve the fair representation
previously obtained. The crutch option I described in SPPA is only one
of many ways to do that, using time as an additional dimension
in this case.


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