[EM] Re: Condorcet package

Stephane Rouillon stephane.rouillon at sympatico.ca
Thu May 26 21:33:25 PDT 2005

Using winning vote as criteria offers the guarantee that truncators
cannot elect another candidate instead of a strong condorcet winner.

Although, as Blake argued, it seems winning votes could increase
the tendancy of using a burying-strategy instead to achieve the same goal.

It is not clear to me which criteria will provide the least esperance
(mathematical sense) to the best corresponding unsincere strategy.


Rob LeGrand a écrit :

> Ted wrote:
> > As Kevin has pointed out, by counting a=b as a>b + b>a, winning
> > votes (wv) acquires some characteristics of relative margins
> > (rm).  With your tabulation rule, the margin doesn't change, but
> > the winning vote totals do.
> Counting A=B as 1/2 A>B + 1/2 B>A is equivalent to using margins.
> I take this approach at my ranked-ballot voting site without going
> into the matter.  (On the descriptions page I write, "tied ranks
> are counted as half-votes for each side".)  I do it this way
> because I  prefer margins but don't see the debate as important and
> don't want to emphasize it.  Briefly, I prefer margins over
> winning-votes for the following reasons.
> 1.  Zero-info strategy is fully-ranked sincerity under margins, but
> usually not under winning-votes.  (It's often to a voter's
> advantage to vote many tied ranks near the top.)
> 2.  Margins is more intuitive and easier to explain to most people.
> 3.  I haven't seen that winning-votes truly offers any valuable
> strategic guarantees over margins.
> =====
> Rob LeGrand, psephologist
> rob at approvalvoting.org
> Citizens for Approval Voting
> http://www.approvalvoting.org/
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