[EM] Re: Condorcet package

[Stephane Rouillon]

Using winning vote as criteria offers the guarantee that truncators
cannot elect another candidate instead of a strong condorcet winner.

Although, as Blake argued, it seems winning votes could increase
the tendancy of using a burying-strategy instead to achieve the same goal.

It is not clear to me which criteria will provide the least esperance
(mathematical sense) to the best corresponding unsincere strategy.

Steph.

Rob LeGrand a écrit :

> Ted wrote:
> > As Kevin has pointed out, by counting a=b as a>b + b>a, winning
> > votes (wv) acquires some characteristics of relative margins
> > (rm).  With your tabulation rule, the margin doesn't change, but
> > the winning vote totals do.
>
> Counting A=B as 1/2 A>B + 1/2 B>A is equivalent to using margins.
> I take this approach at my ranked-ballot voting site without going
> into the matter.  (On the descriptions page I write, "tied ranks
> are counted as half-votes for each side".)  I do it this way
> because I  prefer margins but don't see the debate as important and
> don't want to emphasize it.  Briefly, I prefer margins over
> winning-votes for the following reasons.
>
> 1.  Zero-info strategy is fully-ranked sincerity under margins, but
> usually not under winning-votes.  (It's often to a voter's
> advantage to vote many tied ranks near the top.)
> 2.  Margins is more intuitive and easier to explain to most people.
> 3.  I haven't seen that winning-votes truly offers any valuable
> strategic guarantees over margins.
>
> =====
> Rob LeGrand, psephologist
> rob at approvalvoting.org
> Citizens for Approval Voting
> http://www.approvalvoting.org/
>
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