Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Tue May 24 08:37:42 PDT 2005


--- Russ Paielli <6049awj02 at sneakemail.com> a écrit:
> Kevin,
> MMPO sounds interesting -- even though it fails the Condorcet criterion.

I consider that particular failing to be minor. The SDSC failure with 4+
candidates is what alarms me, and what led me to suggest using CDTT methods.

> I note that it selects the candidate with the minimum of the maximum 
> pairwise votes against. Just out of curiousity, have you (or anyone 
> else, as far as you know) considered the converse, selecting the 
> candidate with the maximum of the minimum pairwise votes in favor?

Yes, Woodall calls this "MinGS" ("GS" meaning "gross score"). It has
roughly the same properties as MMPO (aka "MinDAGS"), but MinGS satisfies
the Plurality criterion, and satisfies LNHelp instead of LNHarm. I
don't believe it would satisfy FBC, since increasing v[a,b] in the
pairwise matrix can increase the odds that A wins at the expense of
candidates other than B.

Kevin Venzke


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