[EM] Re: Malfunctioning criteria
nkklrp at hotmail.com
Fri May 6 22:00:25 PDT 2005
>I defined my PMC as I did so that it would match the intent of MC, and so
>that it wouldn't have the ridiculous malfunction that FHC has.
>Your FHC loses meaningfulness when it says that Plurality has an advantage
>over Approval when, in regards to
>what makes Pluralitly pass FHC, Plurality has no meaningful advantage over
>Approval.. Your FHC malfunctions seriously in that way.
In other words, you reject my more straightforward definition of MC...
No, FHC isn't more straightforward than PMC. It's just different. If you
like criteria to be similar to eachother, PMC is similar to the majorilty
defensive strategy criteria, though it is different from CC & MMC.
...because approval fails it while plurality passes it.
I think that it's intellectually dishonest to bend and stretch basic
criteria definitions so that your favorite methods pass them, unless you
are very clear that this is what you are doing.
I am and have been very clear that that was what I was doing. You seem to
believe that my argument for PMC over FHC is that I want a criterioin that
treats Approval better, because I like Approval. But is that what I said?
Here's what I said, and what I say now: What makes IRV pass FHC, when
Approval doesn't pass it, is something that anyone would agree is a
disadvantage of Plurality, not a disadvantage. When a criterion calls a
disadvantage an advantage, I call that a malfunction. It would be a
malfunction whether I liked Approval or not. Would I call it a malfunction
if I didn't like Approval? What evidence is there about that question?
Approval would pass CC if CC were defined votes-only, as you yourself said.
Though I like Approval and CR, and though they both fail CC, MMC, SFC, GSFC,
and SDSC, I don't try to re-define those criteria so that Approval and CR
will pass them.
You can say that I'm a liar, and that my actual motive is to try to
misrepresent the criteria so that I can reject a criterion that Approval
fails, and advocate a criterion that Approval passes. But since you don't
have ESP, you need to concentrate instead on trying to deny that FHC is
You were fairly clear about this in the beginning, but perhaps you bought
into your own trick
If saying that FHC is malfunctioning, for the reasons that I stated, when it
says that Plurality passes and Approval fails, when Plurality passes due to
something that we all know is a disadvantage of Plurality with respect to
Approval, is a trick, and if you want others to believe that it's a trick,
the first thing you need to do is to tell convincingly why you think that it
isn't a malfunction when FHC says that. If you could establsh that, then you
could claim that I'm trying to misrepresent the situation. But you haven't
done that. Instead you repeat previous answered statements and try to change
the subject to the motives of the person you disagree with. That's a common
tactic of people who are arguing an indefensible claim.
, as you now seem to treat your "PMC" as if it were
perfectly natural MC definition, and absurdly refer to my more
straightforward MC definition as the "freedom haters criterion".
FHC gives a passing grade to Plurality for no reason other than the fact
that Plurality doesn't let us help our favorite when we help a compromise.
Plurality takes away that freedom that Approval allows. That's the
difference between them. And that denial of voter-freedom is what makes
Pluralityl pass FHC when Approval fails it.
And no, FHC is not more straightforward than PMC.
>I defined my PMC as I did so that it would match the intent of MC,
How do you determine the intent of MC?
We don't disagree on the intent of MC. The way to judge the intent of a
criterion is by noting what people generally say abouit what passes it and
what doesn't. Borda is the method usually considered the only proposed
method that fails MC.
You wrote a special purpose, ad-hoc MC that Approval fails. But it has not
been generally agreed that Approval fails MC. Certainly Approval doesn't
fail votes-only MC, the MC usually quoted.
CR fails votes-only MC, but we don't hear anything about that. We don't hear
it affirmed as what people expect from MC.
If people have been using votes-only MC, and not saying that Approval should
fail MC, then it can't be said that the intent of MC is for Approval to fail
MC. If we haven't heard anything affirming that CR is a
majority-criterion-failing method, then you can't say that it's the intent
of MC that CR fails it.
PMC is failed by the notoriously, uniquely antimajoritarian Borda. Borda is
the method known as the method that fails MC. As I said, check _Selected
Topics in Voting Systems_, by Shiffrin, published by Springer-Verlag.
As I said, votes-ony MC's distinction between Approval and CR isn't as wrong
as FHC's distinction between Pliurality and Approval, because the freedom
that CR adds to Approval isn't strategically valuable. But it's
strategically harmless because no one is forced to use it, and because the
person who wants the best for himself/herself will use CR as Approval. So CR
fails MC, when Approval passes, merely because someone who chooses to lose
advantage can do so. So, to a lesser degree, votes-only MC is malfunctioning
when it says that CR fails when Approval passes, because of CR's option to
forfeit strategic voting.
For the reasons stated above, it doesn't make any sense when FHC says that
Plurality passes and Approval doesn't.
>Notice that MC is nothing more than a special case of MMC, where set S
>contains only one member.
>No. It isn't. Your version, FHC, is. My version, PMC, is not.
Oh. I thought that there was an EM list consensus on MC being the case of
MMC where the majority set has one member. Apparently I was wrong.
That's correct, you were wrong. No one else on EM has defined MC in that
MC and MMC differ in that what corresponds to MMC's majority set, in MC, has
only one member, but that isn't enough to say that MC is a case of MMC,
because there are other differences in how they've been defined. MC has
always been stated as a votes-only criterion. MMC is defined as a preference
criterion. Both preference definitions of MC are new. One of them
don't agree that MC and MMC are related in this way, then that's where we
MC and MMC are related in this way: MC's "majority set" consists of only one
candidate, while MMC's majority set can have any number of candidates. But
that isn't the only difference between those criteria, as they've been
understood on EM. And if you disagree with that sentence, then yes, that's
where we differ. In that case, since we've found out where we differ,
there's no need for further discussion about this, unless you have evidence
that FHC has been the understood MC definition on EM or in jounals, etc.
Resolved: I think that your universally applicable MC definition is
bizarre and intellectually dishonest.
That's a funny thing to say, coming from someone who made up FHC as a
made-to-order criterion when asked if there's something that Approval fails
and Plurality passes.
Sure, you could say that PMC is made-to-order too. But there's a difference:
I have justified my statement that FHC is malfunctioning. You have done
nothting other than to change the subject to my motives. I've said from the
start that I justify PMC, over FHC, because FHC is saying something that
makes no sense.
And, as for bizarre, yes there is one bizarre thing about this: FHC's
bizarre conclusion that Plurality passes where Approval fails, because of
something that is universally understood to be a disadvantage of Plurality
with respect to Approval. That's what's bizarre. That and the fact that such
a sloppy and careless dunce would speak so loudly and assertively here.
You think that my universally
applicable MC criterion...
...universally applicable only if you ignore its ridiculous malflunction in
the comparison of Approval and Plurality.
Probably there is no need to continue this discussion much longer.
Yes! You've got it! At least you got that right.
On the road to retirement? Check out MSN Life Events for advice on how to
get there! http://lifeevents.msn.com/category.aspx?cid=Retirement
More information about the Election-Methods