[EM] Re: AWP versus DMC and AM
cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au
Thu May 5 11:09:52 PDT 2005
In this example of James G-A's:
Direction of defeats
Approvals: A48, B46, C47.
Originally, A was "Bush", B was "Kerry" and C was
"Dean"; and the 26 A>>C>B voters were presumed to be
Burying B (i.e., sincere was A>>B>C).
You wrote (Thur.Apr.28):
>What happens if the 22 B>C>>A voters move the
approval cutoff upward,
> 22: B>>C>A
> Approvals: A48, B46, C25.
>Consider the pairwise array with approval on the
> A B C
> A 48 48 52
> B 52 46 49
> C 48 51 25
>B is now the DMC (and MRAV/AM) winner.
>Even if the 19: C>B>>A voters moved their cutoff up
>as well, B would still win.
>This illustrates a Later-no-harm violation of the
>approval cutoff inDMC/AM: B- and C-preferring voters
>actually get the better effect of defeating A if they
>do NOT approve each other.
CB: Presumably you meant to write that those anti-A
voters *can* "actually get the better effect of
defeating A etc." because you also wrote:
>B would also have been elected if the "6: C>>B>A"
>voters had moved their cutoff below B.
Leaving aside for the time being what we call it, the
property/criterion I think you are referring to could
be defined thus:
"If x wins, and afterwards some identical ballots
that approve x are uniformly changed only so that they
approve more candidates than previously; then if there
is a new winner it must be one of the candidates
approved on these altered ballots."
Does AWP meet this? (James?).
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