[EM] Truncation incentive with LNHarm (was "Burying and defection")

[Kevin Venzke]

Hello,

I wanted an opportunity to mention this, and Chris brings it up:

 --- Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> a écrit : 
> 46 abc
> 44 bca (sincere is bac)
> 05 cab
> 05 cba
> 
> I agree that in a public political election with
> reasonably well-informed voters and truncation
> allowed, this is an unrealistic example if  any method
> that fails absolute
> Later-no-harm is used.

Actually, even when LNHarm is satisfied, it can be the case that the A 
voters are better off truncating. In this kind of scenario (i.e., where 
it's known that A>B pairwise, but not known how the A and B voters will
vote), MMPO and the CDTT methods (which satisfy LNHarm in the three-candidate
case) behave basically the same as WV.

Specifically, although it's true that the A voters can't make A lose by
giving B the second preference, they can make A win if they make the B
voters believe that they're going to just vote "A."

My hope is that at least the B voters, who expect to be beaten pairwise by 
A, would give A the second preference in order to make A the decisive winner. 
The alternative is that (using MMPO or the CDTT) also C is a potential winner.

Kevin Venzke



	

	
		
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