[EM] publicly acceptable election methods

[Kevin Venzke]

James,

 --- James Green-Armytage <jarmyta at antioch-college.edu> a écrit : 
Russ wrote:
> >The voters rank the candidates and also specify an Approval cutoff. The 
> >CW wins if one exists, otherwise the least approved candidate is 
> >repeatedly eliminated until a CW is obtained.

> 2. It is not Smith-efficient; that is, it doesn't always choose a member
> of the minimal dominant set. I think that Condorcet methods that lack
> Smith efficiency are somewhat inelegant. Definition of Smith set:
> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2005-February/014742.html

It is Smith-efficient. When you eliminate just one candidate at a time,
it's not possible to eliminate all Smith members without turning one of
them into a CW in the process.

Kevin Venzke



	

	
		
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