[EM] SFC and "margins vs. winning votes"

[Kevin Venzke]

Daniel,

 --- Daniel Bishop <dbishop at neo.tamu.edu> a écrit : 
> >So, what do you make of my favorite scenario?:
> >
> >49 A
> >24 B
> >27 C>B
> >
> Consider the ballots:
> 
> 49 A
> 24 B
> 24 C>B
> 
>  In summary,
> 
> * Electing A is equivalent to discarding 3 ballots
> * Electing B is equivalent to discarding 7 ballots
> * Electing C is equivalent to discarding 23 ballots
> 
> Based on this argument, A should be elected.

I think it would be better to disregard the noise candidate, C, than to
discard ballots and reverse the only majority opinion we got.

Electing A will give voters the impression that they can't vote for a
sincere favorite, out of fear that they will sink their compromise choice.

> I know you're asking, "What if the sincere preferences were 49 A>B>C + 
> 24 B>C>A + 27 C>B>A?  Then B would be the sincere Condorcet winner."  
> But if this were the case, then the B>C>A voters would have been better 
> off voting sincerely.  So why didn't they?

Actually, I don't care how the A>B>C voters vote. It is obvious that they
shouldn't vote A>B>C. So suppose the B voters vote B>C>A? Then both Margins
and WV would elect C. So it's not exactly safe for them to vote that way.
They are probably counting on your threat that A will be elected, to convince
the C voters to just vote "B."

Kevin Venzke



	

	
		
Découvrez le nouveau Yahoo! Mail : 250 Mo d'espace de stockage pour vos mails ! 
Créez votre Yahoo! Mail sur http://fr.mail.yahoo.com/