[EM] Why my criteria

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

I already said that my criteria are intended to measure for the goal of 
getting rid of the lesser-of-2-evils problem, the goal of minimizing need 
for defensive strategy that keeps people from expressing what they actually 
want in an election.

But I´d like to clarify that a bit. This is something that I´ve already said 
before, but, with the discussion these days, this is a good time to say it 
again:

A majority can get its way. The only question is, what does thaat majority 
have to in order to get its way.

The lesser-of-2-evils problem is a problem for a majority, for instance. For 
example, say that, in Florida in 2000, there was a strong majority who 
preferred Kerry to Bush. But they almost lost, because a few 
Nader-preferrers voted for Nader instead of helping Kerry (That´s ok if, 
like me, you didn´t consider Kerry deserving of a vote). Well, it´s ok in 
the sense that I vote that way, but it isn´t ok that it lets Kerry lose when 
a majority prefer Kerry to Bush.

So the problem is when a majority need drastic falsification in order to 
protect majority rule.

I define defensive strategy as strategy intended to protect the win of a CW 
or to protect majority rule. A precise definition of majority rule will be 
posted as soon as I catch up with the current and recent e-mail.

Because the lesser-of-2-evils problem is a problem of a majority, what that 
majority has to do in order to protect majority rule, it ísn´t surprising 
that most of my defensive strategy criteria are about a majority.

If a majority all want the same candidate to win, with almost any method 
they can easily make him/her win by all just voting that candidate over 
everyone else. Borda is an exception to that, because, with Borda, they 
could need to know how their opponents are voting in order to make their 
common favorite win. But, as I said, Borda is an exception.

But isn´t easy for a majority to keep a particular candidate from winning. 
In the well-known lesser-of-2-evils problem, the problem is to keep the 
greater-evil from winning. And the problem is that it´s necessary for some 
voters to bury their favorite in order to do so. (Well that situation 
doesn´t necessarily really exist in our political system, but, due to the 
lesser-of-2-evils problem, the mere media-deceived belief that that´s so is 
enogh to make it effectively so).

So my majority defensive strategy criteria are about what a majority has to 
do in order to keep some greater-evil from winning.

So the subject of those criteria was chosen directly from the obvious nature 
of tjhe lesser-of-2-evils problem. What does a majority need to do in order 
to keep some greater-evil from winning?

No, I´m not saying that, in a person´s preference ordering, there´s 
necessarily one distinct greater-evil, as opposed so a smooth gradation of 
preference. I clarify that, before someone points it out to me. But the fact 
remains that, so often, there is a candidate whom a majority (at least think 
that they) need to bury their favorite in order to defeat. That´s why I 
wrote the majority defensive strategy criteria.

Mike Ossipoff

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