[EM] Kevin, 1 March, 1918 GMT

[Kevin Venzke]

Mike,

 --- MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com> a écrit : 
> Kevin continued:
> 
> So, a method would satisfy WDSC if the C>A>D>E>B>F>G voters, comprising a
> majority, could deny B the win by voting C=A>D=E>B=F>G. It isn't necessary
> that there be any other way for them to deny B the win.
> 
> I reply;
> 
> You got it. One is all it takes.

> Kevin continued:
> 
> I think that's kind
> of a silly way to satisfy WDSC
> 
> I reply:
> 
> It was you who talked about a method in which it had to be done in that 
> particular way. You must distinguish between silliness of WDSC and silliness 
> of your hypothetical methods. A good way to make that distinction would be 
> to find a silly way that needs to be voted in order to make an actual 
> proposed method meet WDSC. Can you do that?

That would be missing the point. If WDSC makes a meaningful guarantee, there
shouldn't be a silly, meaningless way of satisfying it.

> Kevin continues:
> 
> FBC:
> >By voting a less-liked candidate over his/her favorite, a voter should 
> >never gain an outcome that he/she likes better than every outcome that 
> >he/she could get without voting a less-liked candidate over his/her 
> >favorite.
> 
> I think this is clear, but hard to use. Suppose if I vote B>A>C>D>E, when A 
> is my
> sincere favorite (that is, I like candidates who come earlier 
> alphabetically), then
> B is elected. Suppose we try 20 other ways of voting, all with A at the top 
> or
> equal top, and these all elect E. I want to conclude that this is an FBC 
> failure.
> I can't, though, because it might be the case that e.g. A=E>B=D>C will elect 
> A.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> The way to demonstrate that a method fails a criterion is to find a 
> situation in which, with that method, the criterion´s premise conditions are 
> met, and the criterion´s requirement is not met.

> Also, in general I have to check what results one could get from B>C>D>E>A, 
> D>C>E>B>A,
> C>B>E>D>A, etc., no matter how unlikely it is to occur to someone to vote in 
> such
> insincere ways.
> 
> You do that. But first find out what the method is, and the situation.



> Kevin continued:
> 
> So I think a criterion like WDSC could afford to be more precise.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> But you forgot to say in what way WDSC, or a criterion like it, is 
> imprecise. A criterion is imprecise if you can show that its wording could 
> mean more than one thing, or that it isn´t possible to say what its wording 
> means.

I meant that a criterion like WDSC should guarantee more. As it is, not only
is it abnormally difficult to verify compliance, but there are silly ways of
satisfying it. Compare my rendition:

> Kevin continued:
> 
> As a first
> guess, I suggest: "If a majority of all the voters vote A in first or equal
> first, and B in last or equal last, then B mustn't win." If that doesn't
> resemble Mike's intention
> 
> I reply:
> 
> ...and it doesn´t resemble WDSC.

But it implies WDSC, is easier to check, and doesn't allow silly methods of
compliance.

Kevin Venzke



	

	
		
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