[EM] Markus, criteria

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Tue Mar 1 05:50:49 PST 2005


Markus,

 --- Markus Schulze <markus.schulze at alumni.tu-berlin.de> a écrit : 
> As far as I have understood FBC correctly, then it
> is about individual voters and not about coalitions
> of voters.

Ok, I see that this is a problem.

> You wrote (1 March 2005):
> > I have to interpret "result" to mean "the candidate
> > who actually got the seat," since as you have noticed,
> > a ranking of candidates can't usually be used to rank
> > probability distributions.
> 
> I see more than one possible interpretation. Examples:
> 
> 1. Mike uses the resolute model. (The "resolute model"
>    says that for every possible profile the winner is
>    determined in advance.)

If I understand, the "resolute model" is the interpretation that
I suggested, where a method returns a winner rather than a probability
distribution.

> 2. Mike talks about coalitions of like-minded voters
>    rather than about single voters. But then the
>    question is whether all these like-minded voters
>    have to vote in the same manner or whether they
>    may vote differently.

I think this must be the case. Considering the rationale behind the
criterion, I don't think it makes sense for the voters to be able
to vote differently. But it would have to be clarified.

> 3. For every set of candidates such that this voter
>    strictly prefers [*] each candidate of this set to
>    each candidate outside this set, there is a way of
>    voting where he doesn't vote a less-liked candidate [*]
>    over his favorite [*] and where the probability that
>    the winner is chosen from this set is not strictly
>    smaller than for any way of voting where he votes
>    a less-liked candidate [*] over his favorite [*].
> 
> 4. There is a way of voting where this voter doesn't
>    vote a less-liked candidate [*] over his favorite [*]
>    and where for every set of candidates, such that this
>    voter strictly prefers [*] each candidate of this set
>    to each candidate outside this set, the probability
>    that the winner is chosen from this set is not
>    strictly smaller than for any way of voting where he
>    votes a less-liked candidate [*] over his favorite [*].

I read these about 8 times and couldn't find a difference between
them; in fact if you move #4's "for every set ... outside this
set," to the beginning of the paragraph, #3 and #4 become almost
identical.

I don't like this interpretation, but I agree that "outcome" in
the FBC definition could be clarified.

> You wrote (1 March 2005):
> > Pretending Mike agrees with my interpretation (and that
> > he clarifies FBC accordingly), do you think FBC would
> > then be unambiguous?
> 
> Your question is quite hypothetic because Mike will
> never clarify his definitions.

Maybe he will at least clarify them on EM.

Kevin Venzke



	

	
		
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