[EM] Early discussion of wv on EM

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Yes, judging by the archives, Rob started EM in February '96. But a posting 
from Steve in EM's 1st month, February '96, shows that the Single-Winner 
Committee had been operating for some time before that.

I include, in this posting, below, a copy of a May '96 posting of mine to 
EM. But you needn't depend on my re-posting those postings, links being 
posted to them. Just check out the earliest EM archives for yourself.

Before I get to the posting, though, I point out that, even if we only have 
the EM archives, and not those of the Single-Winner Committee, those 
archives show that I was advocating wv (sometimes referred to there as 
"votes-for", and described as measuring defeat strength by the voted support 
for the defeat), well before my first mention of GMC.

And they show that I was advocating wv by its general advantages and 
justifications, the fact that it records and counts the number of people who 
voted against a candidate, which reassures the lesser-of-2-evils voter who 
needs to register his vote against someone so badly that he'll give up 
voting for those he really likes. I told how ww, for that reason, makes it 
easier to ensure that some gsreater-evil will lose, just by voting someone 
else over him, because those votes are kept and not deleted by subtraction, 
as happens in Margins. I told how that's why wv honors majority rule and 
Margins doesn't.

Thsoe general arguments for wv are in those eary EM archives.

And they're found on days that were long before my first mention of GMC.

Buit, though it isn't true, what if during the same days when I was making 
those general wv advocacy arguments, I'd also been saying "A good thing 
about wv is that it makes PC meet GMC."

Would that somehow negate the general arguments? No, it would merely mean 
that I was stating an additional thing I liked about wv.

I wanted to mention that, but I re-emphasize that the archives show that I 
was stating those general arguments for wv long before I mentioned GMC. In 
fact, those general wv advocacy arguments can be found in the 2nd month of 
the EM archives, March '96.

If we had the archives of the Single-Winner Committee, postings much earlier 
than those could be found.

I mention all this and re-post the May '96 posting below, in reply to 
questions about early advocacy of wv.

Here's the May 10th, 1996 posting. Part of it is from me, and part of it is 
someone whom I was quoting and replying to:

Condorcet proposed scoring the candidates according to their
worst defeat. He wasn't specific about how to measure that
defeat, probably since no one was considering the possibility
of short rankings. My proposal is a version of Condorcet's
method, as proposed by Condorcet. My proposal is consistent
with what Condorcet proposed. One of the possibilities implied
by his proposal. I've posted often here about why votes-against
is the desirable way to measure defeats.

[...meaning that that wv advocacy began well before May '96]

[Someone had said]:


          I find this scheme artificial. While circular

Voting systems are proposed by people, not picked from trees.

[I reply below. For the rest of this posting, I trust that it will be clear 
which part is from me and which part is from the person to whom I was 
replying]

Is majority rule artificial too? Most would agree that it's natural.
Condorcet's method carries out majority rule where your random
method & your votes-for method wouldn't. When I say "Condorcet's
method", I'm referring to my votes-against  version of it.

[I mention Condorcet a few times below, and, from the above-quoted sentence, 
those references to "Condorcet" or "Condorcet's method" refer to wv 
Condorcet, in this posting and others, including the March posting that I'm 
going to re-post]

In Steve's many-candidate example, there could be a majority ranking
Clinton over Dole, and Condorcet's method would count that.
A method counting votes-for would ignore it, and would work more
like MPV, making anti-Dole votes sorry they didn't vote Clinton
in 1st place.

Look, in the U.S., this November, millions of progressives are
going to cast a vote-against, for which they're quite willing
to give up the opportunity to cast a vote for their favorite.
Condorcet's method lets them cast that reliably-counted vote-against,
while still voting their favorite in 1st place, and while still
ranking Clinton as low as they want to--provided that they merely
rank him over the candidate they want to defeat.

Votes-against are artificial? Tell that to the Democrat-voting
progressives--but they'll do it anyway.

    ties are logically possible, I am not sure that they are
probable nor do I know what they would mean. I am inclined


I've repeatedly showed you that the common practice of truncation
will cause circular ties even when there's a candidate who, when
compared separately to each one of lthe others,  is preferred to
him by more voters than vice-versa. Trunction can take victory
away from Condorcet winners, in your methods, but not in Condorcet's
method.



    to think that they would mean that the voters have no great
preference between the candidates involved in the tie. If
my assumption is correct, then the winner may more simply
and reasonably be decided by drawing lots.


Yes, if you don't value majority rule, and if you don't care
to get rid of the lesser-of-2-evils problem.

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