[EM] Sincere methods
Juho Laatu
juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk
Tue Mar 22 23:15:52 PST 2005
Hello All,
In an earlier mail I brought up the question what would be the best
Condorcet completion method in the case that we would have the luxury
of sincere votes. I would appreciate your comments on this. Possible
answers could be e.g.
- one method that is best for all or most single winner elections
- one of few good methods depending on the targets of the election
(different method for presidential elections and for selecting the best
day for a meeting)
- any method (= anyone can be elected if there is no Condorcet winner)
- any method as long as it elects from the Smith set (Smith set is an
example of a criterion that many seem to respect)
I already gave some support to seeing MinMax (margins) ("least
additional votes") as one potential "sincere method" (criticism
received too). I think Mike Ossipoff indicated some support to the idea
that different methods could be the best choice for different
elections. Any examples of a voting method that is the best in some
certain environment would be welcome too. It would be interesting to
understand how much "sincere methods" and "strategic methods" (i.e.
methods that try to defend against strategic voting) differ from each
others or if they are sometimes even the same thing.
Any opinions?
Best Regards,
Juho
More information about the Election-Methods
mailing list