[EM] Exactly: Voting systems that allow true preference expression
MIKE OSSIPOFF
nkklrp at hotmail.com
Thu Mar 3 08:58:02 PST 2005
Ted´s message, which I copy below, expresses the reason why we need a better
voting system. And it also should serve as a guide to what properties that
better voting system should have.
I´ve been saying that my purpose with voting system reform is to get rid of
the lesser-of-2-evils problem, or, to say it more generally, to minimize the
need for defensive strategy that conceals voters´preferences.
That´s what we need a better voting system for.
That´s the standard that my criteria are intended to measure for, and that´s
the standard for which I chose the methods that I advocate: Approval, CR, wv
Condorcet.
Some would prefer criteria that don´t say "prefer". Sure, some could argue
that there´s something nice about writing a criterion that only refers to
votes--if such a criterion is enough. The problem is that no-prefernce,
votes-only criteria tend to have some ridiculous problems. So, if you think
my preference criteria are somehow unaesthetic, I answer that the ridiculous
problems of the votes-only criteria are worse.
Those problems include:
1. Having a Condorcet´s Criterion that Plurality passes.
2. Stipulating that the criterion applies only to rank methods, or that it
doesn´t apply to Plurality
3. Saying that any method that isn´t a rank method fails the criterion.
Solutions 2 & 3 are rules-criteria, criteria that refer to a method´s rules
in its premise or its requirement.
Take your pick, if you want to not have "preference" in the definition of
Condorcet´s Criterion. I´m not claiming that those solutions would even work
with my defensive strategy criteria.
I emhasize that, contrary to what Markus claims, my defensive strategy
criteria are defned, and are well-defined, by any reasonable defintiion of
those terms. There´s no ambiguity or vagueness in their definitions,and
there´s no situation in which it can´t be clearly and definitely said,
without disagreement, whether a method passes one of those criteria or fails
it.
I also emphasizes that I´m not trying to say that there shouldn´t be any
other criteria for the goal that I stated. Of course I welcome anyone else
to write other lesser-of-2-evils criteria, or defensive strategy criteria,
criteria intended to get rid of the lesser-of-2-evils problem, the need for
drastic defensive strategy, which makes millions of voters afraid to express
what they actually want.
So, if someone doesn´t like my defensive strategy criteria, I encourage them
to write their own.
But if someone wants to say that my defensive strategy criteria aren´t
defined, then I invite the to post a situation in which at least one of my
criteria doesn´t give an unambiguous answer about whether some method passes
or fails.
Mike Ossipoff
Ted´s message:
An interesting item I just read:
http://instapundit.com/archives/021490.php
"This illustrates, in a mild way, the reason why totalitarian
regimes collapse so suddenly. . . . Such regimes have little
legitimacy, but they spend a lot of effort making sure that
citizens don't realize the extent to which their fellow-citizens
dislike the regime. If the secret police and the censors are
doing their job, 99% of the populace can hate the regime and be
ready to revolt against it - but no revolt will occur because no
one realizes that everyone else feels the same way."
Originally he was talking about flags up 6 months after 9/11. Now
he's talking about Lebanon and Syria.
But the real point to take home is why people on this list should be
working for voting method reform -- the true preferences of the people
are not fully expressed. When people have the opportunity to express
their true preferences and see what others are expressing, tremendous
positive change can result.
I would add that polls are insufficient for communicating the
prevailing sentiment of the general populace.
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