[EM] Markus, criteria

[Markus Schulze]

Dear Kevin,

you wrote (1 March 2005):
> I think, in short, that the "situation" (of odds
> distribution) is not relevant to FBC.

As far as I have understood FBC correctly, then it
is about individual voters and not about coalitions
of voters. However, an individual voter usually only
changes the outcome from one decisive situation to an
indecisive situation or from one indecisive situation
to a decisive situation or from one indecisive
situation to another indecisive situation. But an
individual voter usually doesn't change an outcome
from a situation where candidate A wins decisively to
a situation where another candidate B wins decisively.

You wrote (1 March 2005):
> I have to interpret "result" to mean "the candidate
> who actually got the seat," since as you have noticed,
> a ranking of candidates can't usually be used to rank
> probability distributions.

I see more than one possible interpretation. Examples:

1. Mike uses the resolute model. (The "resolute model"
   says that for every possible profile the winner is
   determined in advance.)

2. Mike talks about coalitions of like-minded voters
   rather than about single voters. But then the
   question is whether all these like-minded voters
   have to vote in the same manner or whether they
   may vote differently.

3. For every set of candidates such that this voter
   strictly prefers [*] each candidate of this set to
   each candidate outside this set, there is a way of
   voting where he doesn't vote a less-liked candidate [*]
   over his favorite [*] and where the probability that
   the winner is chosen from this set is not strictly
   smaller than for any way of voting where he votes
   a less-liked candidate [*] over his favorite [*].

4. There is a way of voting where this voter doesn't
   vote a less-liked candidate [*] over his favorite [*]
   and where for every set of candidates, such that this
   voter strictly prefers [*] each candidate of this set
   to each candidate outside this set, the probability
   that the winner is chosen from this set is not
   strictly smaller than for any way of voting where he
   votes a less-liked candidate [*] over his favorite [*].

[*] according to his sincere preferences

You wrote (1 March 2005):
> Pretending Mike agrees with my interpretation (and that
> he clarifies FBC accordingly), do you think FBC would
> then be unambiguous?

Your question is quite hypothetic because Mike will
never clarify his definitions.

Markus Schulze