[EM] Markus, 1 March, ´05, 1800 GMT

MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp at hotmail.com
Tue Mar 1 10:25:43 PST 2005



Markus said:

Dear Russ,

I interpret Mike Ossipoff's "Strategy-Free Criterion" (SFC)
and "Generalized Strategy-Free Criterion" (GSFC) as follows:

"X >> Y" means that a majority of the voters strictly prefers
candidate X to candidate Y.

SFC: Suppose (1) A >> B and (2) the partial individual
rankings can be completed in such a manner that candidate A
is a Condorcet candidate. Then candidate B must be elected
with zero probability.

I reply:

I don´t know where you got that. If you were trying to write SFC with 
different letter-designations, you´d say that A is the CW, not that the 
partial individual rankings can be completed in such a manner that A is a 
CW.

Additionally, you left out the requirement that no one falsifies a 
preference.

Additionally, you left out the stipulation that the members of that majority 
vote sincerely.

So, if you don´t mind, I´ll be the one to define my criteria. However, I 
invite you to define any criteria you want to, including the one written by 
you that I quoted above. It isn´t SFC, but we can call it Markus´s Non-SFC.

You continued

GSFC: Suppose (1) A >> B and (2) the partial individual
rankings can be completed in such a manner that candidate A
is in the Schwartz set and candidate B is not in the Schwartz
set. Then candidate B must be elected with zero probability.

I reply:

The same objections that I stated for your Non-SFC apply to your Non-GSFC. 
But, additionally, you have changed the sincere Smith set to the Schwartz 
set. The Schwartz set is different from the Smith set. And the sincere Smith 
set differs even more from the Schwartz set, because the sincere Smith set 
is about preferences, while the Schwartz set is about voting results.

So your Non-GSFC differs from GSFC even more than your Non-SFC differs from 
SFC.

As I said, then, I´ll be the one to define my criteia, if you don´t mind.

SFC:

If no one falsifies a preference, and if a majority prefer the CW to 
candidate Y, and vote sincerely, then candidate Y shouldn´t win.

[end of SFC definition]

If you have a problem with that criterion, if you don´t know what some part 
of it means, then ask. If you find, in my definition (not yours) some 
ambiguity, unclarity, etc., tell exactly what is ambiguous or unclear about 
it.

But, better yet, post a situation (configuration of candidates, voters, and 
voters´preferences) such that it isn´t possible to say definitely whether or 
not some method passes the criterion. (Or post that for any of my criteria).

GSFC:

If no one falsifies a preference, and if X is in the sincere Smith set, and 
Y is not in the sincere Smith set, and if a majority of the voters prefer X 
to Y and vote sincerely, then Y shouldn´t win.

[end of GSFC definition]

*********

Markus said:

I could ask Mike Ossipoff whether my interpretation of
his criteria is correct.

I reply:

Your interpretation of my criteria is not correct. If you want to discuss my 
criteria, discuss the ones that I have defined, not the ones that you have 
defined.

Markus continues:

But I guess that I won't get an
answer.

I reply:

You got an answer, just as you always did. At least I´ve always answered 
things you said the first time you said them. In fact I´ve often answered 
things that you´ve said repeatedly as you kept repeating them.

In fact some people say that I shouldn´t keep answering you when you repeat 
things. Don´t expect more answeres to repeated statements or questions.

Markus continues:

(Maybe Mike fears that he could be nailed.

I reply:

Sure, that´s why I´ve been repeatedly asking you to tell exactly what you 
believe is ambiguous, uncler, or undefined about any of my criteria. :-) 
That must also be why I keep asking you to post a situation (configuration 
of candidates, voters, and voters´preferences) with which some method can´t 
definitely be said to pass or not pass one of my criteria.

Markus continues:

Maybe
he fears that the reader observes that his criteria are
only relaxations of my majority beatpath criterion of 1997.)

I reply:

Your majority beatpath criterion doesn´t bear the slightest resemblence to 
any one of my criteria, much less to all of them. To mention just one big 
difference, though there are no similarities, my defensive strategy criteria 
mention preference, and you don´t do so, because you believe that criteria 
shouldn´t mention preference.

But if you have a criterion that you believe that my criteria are derived 
from, post it and tell us why you think that my criteria are derived from 
it.

Mike Ossipoff

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