[EM] Kevin: Power Truncation

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Mon Jun 20 22:56:55 PDT 2005


--- MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com> a écrit :
> And so...what? You've shown that MMPOpt and maxMMPOd can give different 
> results. It's been demonstrated that different methods can give different 
> results. That's why we call them different methods.

On the ballots 49 A, 24 B, 27 C>B, I don't consider it acceptable to elect
A. So the aim of my suggestion is to keep "power truncation" from messing
up in such a basic scenario.

> By the way, in other postings you say or imply that tMMWV and your other 
> similar methods are significantly more likely to meet CC than MMPO or MMPOpt 
> is. But you haven't shown that either.

Well, the CW will always be a tMMWV or tC//A potential winner, whereas sometimes
the only potential MMPO winner is the Condorcet Loser.

> In the acceptable/unacceptable situation that we're discussing, of course 
> equal ranking in 1st place will be pretty much universal. And, depending on 
> how much lesser-of-2-evils voting will continue, with rank balloting, that 
> too would be enough, by itself, to cause lots of equal-ranking in 1st place.
> For one thing, that spoils your near-CC-compliance. For another thing it 
> results in a ridiculous number of ties in public elections.

It also makes CC compliance rather irrelevant. There is no reason why
tMMWV needs to remain indecisive; just put an approval tie-breaker on the

Kevin Venzke


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