[EM] Re: ICC and Approval

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Mon Jun 13 14:56:02 PDT 2005


--- Paul Kislanko <kislanko at airmail.net> a écrit :
> I am not entirely sure who said what because of the way Mike constructs his
> emails, and I don't really care anymore about what you "experts" think one
> way or another, but Mike (or somebody) wrote:
> > Set S is a clone set if, for every particular voter, and for 
> > any candidate X 
> > outside S,  if that voter prefers somone in S to X than s/he prefers 
> > everyone in S to X; and if that voter prefers X to someone in 
> > S, then s/he 
> > prefers X to everyone in S; and if that voter is indifferent 
> > between X and 
> > some candidate in S, then s/he is indifferent between X and 
> > every candidate 
> > in S.
> > 
> > A voter is indifferent between X and Y if s/he doesn't prefer 
> > X to Y and 
> > doesn't prefer Y to X.
> > 
> > [end of clone-set definition]
> Now, this definition pretty much says there can't be a "clone set", because
> any ONE (every particular) voter can break the definition by chosing a
> candidate to be included in it or excluded from it. That makes no sense.

Right. But generally, if a method behaves well with respect to "real" clones,
then it probably behaves well with "almost" clones. You could contrive a method 
where this isn't the case, of course. (For example, a method with an explicit
"identify all clones" step could technically satisfy clone independence, but
fail it for all practical purposes in a public election.)

Kevin Venzke


Appel audio GRATUIT partout dans le monde avec le nouveau Yahoo! Messenger 
Téléchargez cette version sur http://fr.messenger.yahoo.com

More information about the Election-Methods mailing list