[EM] strategy and method complexity and the advantage of minmax methods
Abd ulRahman Lomax
abd at lomaxdesign.com
Wed Jun 8 21:45:17 PDT 2005
At 12:53 PM 6/8/2005, Juho Laatu wrote:
They might also trust a uniform voting method science community telling
them that some certain method is the best one. This is however maybe the
biggest problem of the Condorcet community - no agreement on which method
is the best.
The problem, of course, is rooted in the absence of any consensus on what
"best" means. This absence of consensus seems to exist with respect to the
most elementary aspects of election outcome.
Which is better, a winner supported by half the voters plus one, or a
winner with the largest approval rating? Does it matter how large? If there
is only a plurality first-choice winner, is it better to find some way to
declare a winner based on additional information (using IRV, allowing
overvotes, or using more complex systems), or to run an actual runoff
election, which will likely involve a re-examination of some election issues?
What is needed, I'd say, is consensus, not regarding the "best method," but
simply upon the characteristics and likely -- or preferably demonstrated --
outcomes of the application of each method. Choosing election methods then
becomes a deliberative process based on solid information and broadly
Hmmm.... sounds like a job for a wiki!
(I have elsewhere noted that discussion systems, while they can certainly
help develop a consensus, don't actually function to completion in this
regard unless they include a mechanism for measuring true consensus. One of
the fundamental problems with developing consensus in a mailing list with
no adjunct polling process that includes all interested (or however else
membership is defined) is that the appearance of consensus in that
environment can be quite false. Sometimes this happens because the loudest
voices ultimately drown out the rest. One would think mailing lists not so
vulnerable to this, but extended flame wars, as we've seen on this list,
can drive away a certain segment of people who would otherwise participate.
Even very wordy sober discourse can drive away some, as list traffic
becomes too much. Mea culpa. Enter our superhero, Delegable Proxy....)
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