[EM] Oops--the comparison was with SD, not CWP

James Green-Armytage jarmyta at antioch-college.edu
Wed Jun 1 18:04:39 PDT 2005

James responding to Mike, on the subject of MM(po)'s FBC compliance...

Mike wrote:
>I've told why FBC is worth the loss of those other criteria: FBC is very 
>much related to the matter of drastic defensive strategy need. Those
>criteria affect that less. Voters seem to feel a need to bury their 
>favorite, even with rank methods, and so it would be best to propose a
>method that absolutely guarantees that they don't need to do that.

	I've already offered a critique of this argument, in my previous response
to Mike.
	(About halfway down the message; the first paragraph starts with "FBC.
Favorite betrayal criterion...") In this case, Mike seems to be "repeating
already-answered statements", as he so frequently accuses me of doing.
	To summarize the critique: If there is widespread compromising-reversal
behavior in methods with very frequent/intense compromising-reversal
incentive (such as plurality and nER-IRV), that doesn't necessarily mean
that there will be widespread compromising-reversal behavior in methods
with minimal compromising-reversal incentive (such as SD(wv) and
beatpath(wv)). Hence, Mike has not demonstrated that the difference
between zero compromising-reversal incentive and minimal
compromising-reversal incentive is a very major benefit, capable of
outweighing concerns such as Condorcet, Smith, MMC, CL, etc.

	The strategy terms used above are defined in the electowiki (in the
tactical voting article), and they are also defined on my web site, at


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