[EM] minmax is not a good public election method
stepjak at yahoo.fr
Wed Jun 1 13:24:46 PDT 2005
--- James Green-Armytage <jarmyta at antioch-college.edu> a écrit :
> >Great... I've already said all of that. In any case, I don't think this
> >weakens my point much.
> Well, we disagree there. It seems to directly contradict your point that
> later-no-harm is important because it "gives voters the ability to safely
> rank all of their preferences." I suspect that deterrent counterstrategies
> may need to be widely employed if WV methods (or PO methods) are used in
> contentious elections. If so, this means that voters will often not vote
> their full rankings, in which case I'm not sure how much practical benefit
> MMPO's LNHarm compliance will have.
It's still "safe." It may be important to make other voters believe you're
going to truncate, but it's still the case that ranking a lower candidate
won't hurt a higher candidate.
Voters probably shouldn't rank their main opposition candidate, and I don't
think anyone will need to tell them that. It's a special case.
> Both you and Mike have mentioned equal ranking as the counterstrategy
> response to a minority's attempt to cause a strong cycle to thwart a
> mutual majority. This suggests that MMPO would have an additional
> compromising-compression incentive not found in Smith-efficient WV methods
> such as SD(wv), beatpath(wv), etc.
I'm sure it does.
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