[EM] A new method satisfying FBC, SDSC, and SFC

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Tue Jun 21 15:00:16 PDT 2005


This method does not even require the T-matrix tie rule.

1. The voter submits a ranking; ranked candidates are considered approved.
2. Disqualify every candidate with a majority-strength defeat, unless this
would leave no candidates.
3. Elect the most approved candidate.

This satisfies SDSC because if a majority prefer X to Y, and don't rank Y,
then Y will have a majority-strength defeat. If not all candidates have such
defeats, then Y can't win. If all candidates have such defeats, then Y still
can't win, because X has greater approval than Y.

This satisfies SFC because if no majority prefers anyone to X, then X will
not be disqualified. If X has a majority-strength win over Y, then Y will
be disqualified, so that Y can't win.

This satisfies FBC because if X wins, and a faction has ranked Y insincerely
low, then if this faction raises X and Y to the first position, the winner
will then be either X or Y. This is because X and Y can only lose defeats in
this way, and other candidates can only gain them. Also, only X and Y's
approval can increase.

On the negative side, this fails Clone-Winner, has some offensive strategy
incentive, and I'm not persuaded that this satisfies Plurality.

Kevin Venzke


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