[EM] AERLO loses any FBC. MMPO is Approval. Still the best public method.

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

AERLO obviously tries to reverse whatever has happened. It activates because 
someone didn't want that candidate to win. So obviously it lessens the 
chance that a winner will stay the winner.

So then, do you want to vote your most winnable acceptable candidate in 1st 
place? So that s/he can win, and then face "recall" by AERLO?

If s/he wins, the opposition will rally their candidates to shared 
1st-place,  in an effort to undercut that winner's score.

So vote your most winnable acceptable candidate at the bottom of your 
protected set, to minimize the likellihood that s/he'll win. Then, when s/he 
loses, your AERLO will promote him/her to 1st place, where his/her win won't 
be contested by AERLO, because AERLO only challenges the 1st count.

And if your most winnable acceptable candidate is your favorite, then vote 
your favorite at the bottom of your protected set.

So, AERLO loses FBC. MMPO with AERLO doesn't even conditionally meet 
expectation FBC.

So I no longer advocate AERLO for MMPO, and so I no longer consider SPCA, 
ASPCA, or CSPCA to be attainable at a reasonable price, if at all.

LIkewise for power truncation with ATLO. Together, they lose FBC just as 
AERLO does, and for the same reason. Maybe a bit more aggressively.

But power truncation, by itself, is perfectly ok, and doesn't affect FBC 
compliance.

ATLO by itself? I don't know, but I haven't so far noticed an instance of it 
spoiling FBC compliance.

So then, now my best public election proposal is MMPO with power truncation.

And when, with that method, in an acceptable/unacceptable situation, a voter 
uses his/her best strategy, protecting the acceptable candidates by AERLO 
and power truncation, then MMPO with power truncation becomes identical with 
Approval for that voter.

CR, when voters use their best strategy, also becomes identical to Approval. 
Maybe that's true of all FBC-complying methods. Forest and Kevin, why not 
check out the other FBC-complying methods, such as       tMMWV and the other 
t methods described by Kevin. And like the Ordered-Bucklin variant that 
Forest described, if it meets FBC.

How good properties and criterion compliances can be offered by 
FBC-complying rank methods, with and without enhancements? So far MMPO has 
been discussed. I'm suggesting that Forest and Kevin discuss some of the 
other FBC-complying rank methods.

Anyway, back to MMPO, that's why I said that MMPO is Approval. But, without 
power truncation, the voter has to deal with the strategy of ranking the 
unacceptable candidates in reverse order of winnability, with the most 
winnable at the bottom. That isn't a strategy problem that compares with 
favorite-burial-need. It's a only a nuisance strategy-need. Approval doesn't 
have that need, and power truncation gets rid of that need in MMPO.

Does MMPO improve on Approval in any way? Not for the strategic voter in an 
acceptable/unacceptable situation. But Australian experience indicates that 
some voters need to favorite-bury and some don't. Of course in the U.S. we 
can multiply the favorite-burying percentage by a hundred. Anyway, I'm just 
saying that, for the voters who don't necessarily insist on strategizing, 
maybe MMPO will make sincerity a little more likely for a few of them, as 
compared to Approval.

That's because, when a Nader preferrer moves Dean down from 1st place, in 
MMPO, he's only increasing one of Dean's votes-against--the Nader>Dean vote 
total.  That might not be Dean's worst votes-against. If there are lots of 
candidates, it becomes less and less likely. Even with 3 candidates, it's 
only 50-50 that Dean's worst votes-against is from Nader. In 
contradistinction, in Approval, if you withdraw your vote from Dean, you 
un-support him completely, treating him not better than you treat your last 
choice.

My point is just that, for the person who doesn't insist on strategizing 
(but I'd insist on strategizing), what I've said in the previous paragraph, 
helped more by SFC, could encourage that undecided voter to vote sincerely.

That's MMPO's advantage over Approval. Of course wv has some of that 
advantage too, for much the same reasons. When you lower Dean to 2nd place, 
you're only increasing part of one of the beatpaths to him. Maybe the only 
beatpath to Dean that that Beatpath is part of is the 1-defeat beatpath from 
Nader to Dean. And of course, if it's part of a beatpath from your last 
choice to Dean, it might not be the weakest defeat in that beatpath.

So, again, for the voter who is undecided about strategizing, those facts, 
along with the guarantees of SFC, GSFC, SDSC, CC, Smith, ICC, and MMC could 
encourage that voter to not strategize. But not me, in a public political 
election. Anyway, so SSD, too, offers some sincerity encouragement that 
Approval doesn't offer.

So, not everyone will strategize with SSD. But, as I've been saying, the 
evidence seems to strongly suggest that lots of people will favorite-bury 
unless they've been assured and convinced that the method meets FBC. Not 
just all those Australians, not just the person whom I watched vote in an 
Internet poll, but I myself would strategize in public political elections, 
and would favorite-bury if the method doesn't meet FBC.

In EM polls I don't strategize. One nice thing about EM polls is that we're 
a sincere electorate. That means that all of BeatpathWinner's criteria's 
premise stipulations about sincerity are met. So we get the benefit of 
Condorcet's Criterion, the Smith Criterion, ICC, and MMC. Because we vote 
sincerely, the CW will win every time in BeatpathWinner.

That's why I have been and continue advocating BeatpathWinner for voting in 
committees, organizations and meetings, with sincere electorates.

I don't advocate offering the enhancement options in BeatpathWinner, with 
such an electorate. ATLO &/or power truncation might make a CW lose. AERLO 
wouldn't do that, but it isn't needed, because EM polls should always 
include Approval voting. And Approval accomplishes whatever AERLO, ATLO & 
power truncation could do. So, with Approval balloting the strong strategy 
is available in Approval. No point trying to duplicate that by 
strategicallly enhancing BeatpathWinner.

Mike Ossipoff

Mike Ossipoff

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